Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Headquarters”10 pages
Top 9ecret The front air force of the Polish-GDR front and because it is primarily equipped with short-endurance strategic aviation would normally augment the air Fishbed fighters that have modest radar and missile force of the Combined Baltic Sea Fleet in supporting capabilities and are heavily dependent on jammable the amphibious operation. The coastal front air force GCI control. A lack of undisputed air superiority would be responsible for providing most or all of the could leave the Pact amphibious assault forces partic- air cover for the operation, which would probably' ularly vulnerable (because of their concentration and require the majority of its available fighter sorties. It poor mobility) to NATO air attack would also augment the fleet fighter-bombers in providing air support once the amphibious assault Sufficiency of air support could also be critical, given forces had landed. the decreased fire support capability of the Combined Baltic Fleet because of the retirement of many older The strategic aviation bombers of the Legnica and gun-equipped ships. The Pact could also experience Smolensk strategic air armies would probably partici- difficulty coordinating the allocated air support sor- pate in softening defensive positions before the land- ties because of the many different nationalities and ings and attack NATO reserve forces to prevent their joint forces formations that would be involved. During use in counterattacks. The planned extent of strategic amphibious landing the Pact has had prob- aviation participation is, however, unclear.= lems with establishing effective interservice coopera- tion and with understanding the responsibilities of Execunion. Soviet military writings state that amphib- each of the several commanders involved in each ious lan'dings should be conducted shortly after the phase of these complex operations. execution of the initial massed nuclear strike in a nuclear wa m ithout nuclear strikes Strategic Air Reconnaissance during the early stages of the war, the amphibious Soviet doctrine dictates that strategic reconnaissance landings have been delayed until after about four to support the plans and operations of the General Staff six days of conventional operations, with the exact and the TMO high commands. Strategic reconnais- timing dependent on the prospects for a rapid linkup sance aircraft in the Western TMO probably would with the advancing ground forces of the coastal front. collect warning and targeting information which Soviet writings also state that temporary air superior- could not be obtained by agent sources, signals intelli- ity in the landing area is necessary for the conduct of gence collection, or satellite imagery-and would a successful amphibious landing. The writings note confirm some of the information derived from those that the initial conventional air operation should, if sources.' trategic possible, precede the landing to ensure air supremacy. air reconnaissance would be used in the Western Figure 15 depicts likely amphibious landing areas in TMO to update the status of targets planned for the Danish Straits and the approximate extent of destruction by the SRF in the initial massed nuclear possible Polish-GDR front and Legnica air army strike, to perform damage assessments after these and fighter cover early in the war. subsequent nuclear strikes, and to monitor the loca- tion and movement of strategic reserve forces and Fnrential Problems. The fundamental problem Pact materiel. It would also be used to support strategic planners would have to confront in an amphibious aviation nuclear strikes and to perform preattack and operation would be the extensive minefields which postattack target assessments for conventional air would be sown by the Danish and West German operations. We assume that the majority of strategic Navies at the outset of hostilities (as well as possible ' subsequent mining by the Swedish Navy). NATO mines alone could thwart major amphibious landings in the Danish Straits and Jutland area= Miaintaining air superiority over an amphibious land- ing area could be difcult for the Polish-GDR coastal front air force because its fighter force is small and op-U" -et 56
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.