Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Sea”15 pages
To Secet Figure 15 (continued) Estimated Available Fighter Cover on Day Five of the War' .............. Force Available Resources Tasked Aircraft on Station Sorties __ Aircraft Pilots Day Night Polish-GDR Front 65 125 216 to 324 Four to eight Two Legnica SAA 80 155 240 to 360 F-ur to right Two Data have been rounded to the nearest 5. performance capabilities, without compensating for representativedThe S tylally task a sortie rate of two regimental sorties on operational planning considerations. Ground control of interceptorsday 6 ut we believe they might specify the maximum is assumed not to be a limiting factor on these intercept radiiplannin -rge-ra of three regimental sorties to be flown in because shipboard controllers could be used. The Polish aircraft aresupport of the amphibious operation on day one of the landing (the MIG-21 Fishbeds, and the Legnica SAA aircraft are assumed to benumber spread in the tabulation reflects the difference between M IG-23 Floggers. (Two of the Legnica SAA regiments, howeverdaily sortie rates of two and three). We believe that a regimental arc currently operating the less capable MIG-21 Fishbed but arc sortic is a standard firepower and logistics calculating factor that scheduled to reequip with the SU-27 Flanker during the mid-equates to 40 aircraft sorties for a Soviet fighter regiment. We 1980s-which we believe probably will have a radius of actionestimate a Polish regimental sortie to be about 36 aircraft sorties. similar to the Flogger's Soviet planning norms specify that pilots can fly an average of two u We assume that the Polish tactical fighter division and thesorties a day, but no more than three flights in any one 24-hour Legnica SAA fighter division are committed entirely to the am-period. Aircraft, however, are said to be capable of making four to phibious operation, leaving only two GDR NAD fighter wings tosix fights in 24 hours under surge-operating conditions. A sortie provide all fighter support for coastal front operations and northernrate of either two or three regimental sorties can thus be supported GDR airspace security. We also assume that both divisions havewith the postulated resources available (each aircraft would fly suffered 2 5-percent attrition during the first four days of combatthree-to-five-combat sorties, and each pilot would perform an and have operational readiness rates of 80 er enthescirures areaverage of about 1.5 or 2.5 flights a day). representative of datr The estimated number of aircraft that could be maintained on r We assume that the uto-coi at aircrat ratto was 14:1 at thestation in the fighter cover orbits is based on the assumptions that outset of the war and that noneof the pilots shot down during thethe aircraft always operate in two-ship formations, that each flight first four days of combat had returned for duty with their units.of fighters would spend about 20 minutes on station. and that the fighter cover would be maintained around the clock. We also assume that at least two-thirds of the fighter cover sorties would be flown during daylight when NATO would be expected to mount the heaviest opposition. The number spread reflects the difference between a daily sortie rate of two or three and provides for an intensified level of efort during part of daylight. The intercept radii that are 75 to 90 km beyond the fighter orbits depicted on the map were estimated using Soviet operational planning data. They reflect the average coverage for a fighter carrying one external fuel tank, four air-to-air missiles, and fuel allowance for five minutes of combat at "military power." These radii would be greater if they were based on US technical estimates of maximum aircraft contributed by Poland, the USSR, and the GDR."= amphibious landings have been direct- y supported by airborne landings. Participants. Amphibious hinding operations in the Baltic area would be conducted as joint operations between the Combined Baltic Sea Fleet and the - coastal (normally Polish-GDR) front. The amphibious assault landing forces in these operations would be 55 Top ecret
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.