Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Headquarters”10 pages
Top Secret air force fighter sorties for escort and fighter sweeps Some writers assert that during conventional opera- and between about 150 and 200 front air force tions it is preferable to delay the conduct of airborne fighter-bomber and 50 to 100 strategic air army operations until after the initial conventional air bomber sorties to neutralize air defenses and interdict operation has achieved strategic air supremacy-or at NATO reserves advancing toward the drop zones. least until the front main forces have overrun Support of this magnitude could consume one-third to NATO's forward air defenses. one-half of the resources available to a large front air force, or almost all of the resources at the disposal of a Potential Problems. The greatest threat to the success typical front air force on the day of the drop. The of a major airborne operation would be the high risk front air force would also have to provide top cover of devastating losses. The large, relatively unmancu- and air support to the airborne troops on subsequent verable transport aircraft and the airborne troops they days, as it would for the other forces of the front. carry would be exceptionally vulnerable to any NATO air defenses. The Pact's weak capabilities to conduct tighter sweeps in NATO rear areas could Execution. Major airborne operations probably would make local air superiority in the drop zones difficult be directed by the Western high command, but, once or impossible to maintain. Losses could be particular- on 'he ground, the landing forces would come under I disastrous, if the command of the front being supported. The coordination between VTA and the front air airborne troops would be inserted as deep as 300 km orces broke down and the expected front air forces (but usually only 100 to 200 km) behind NATO lines, support was not provided for the drop. Unexpectedly with the hope of achieving a linkup with front ground adverse weather in the drop zones-unexpected be- forces-in about three to four days. The-drop would cause of inadequate meteorological reconnaissance- typically be planned to last about one to two hours could disorganize the paratroops and inflict substan- (during which local air superiority would have to be tial casualties by causing them to land at disadvanta- maintained by front aviation). The Soviets plan for an gcous positions. Once on the ground, the comparative-airborne division to be inserted with enough supplies ly lightly armed airborne troops wourd have to avoid to last for two or three days, but estimate it would engagements with major NATO reserve formations- subsequently require resupply with between 200 and which would require substantial air interdiction and 300 tons of materiel each day (a task which could be direct air support. This would require extensive air accomplished by a single VTA regiment) reconnaissance and rigorous staff planning and coor- dination between the several participating forces both before and during the operation. The Soviets consider defense suppression to be critical to the successful conduct of an airborne operation. Amphibious Landing Operations Military writings state that VTA losses must be Military writings indicate that the limited to 3 to 4 percent, while they express the fear Soviets intend to conduct amphibious landing opera- that 10- to 15-percent losses may be more realistic tions in the area of the Danish Straits as part of the and that losses could be as high as 50 percent. first strategic operation in the Western TMO. In so Support for an airborne operation would include the doing, they would seal off the Baltic Sea, securing the establishment of a penetration corridor through right flank of the TMO from attack by NATO naval NATO fir defenses using defense suppression attacks forces during the first stage of the strategic operation. and extensive electronic countermeasures by front air forces and ground forces missile and artillery forces (see figure 14). VTA aircraft would overfly NATO territory at low altitudes (typically at 300 to 400 meters) and would be escorted by front air force fighters the entire way to the drop zones. The Soviets consider temporary air superiority in the drop zones to be a prerequisite for a successful airborne operation. 53 top Sccret
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.