Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Cooper”4 pages
T6p Secret operations, supporting amphibious landing operations, air operation would be determined by the depth,and conducting strategic air reconnaissance. These nature, importance, and priority of the targets. Theactivities would be largely planned and directed by Legnica and Smolensk strategic air armies wouldthe high command in the TMO, probably because make up the primary attack forces for air operationstheir objectives, which are important to the success of in the Western TMO. Reinforcements could comethe TMO strategic operation, cannot be accomplished from the Vinnitsa and Moscow air armies, and, inby a single front or fleet. In almost all cases these certain situations, even the Irkutsk air army. Frontsactivities also would require the use of Soviet national would provide air defense suppression and fighterstrategic reserve forces." The extensive support that cover support for strategic aviation bombers transitingwould be provided by the Warsaw Pact air forces to their sectors of responsibility. the operational-level objectives of the fronts, fleet, and armies in the TMO would, in the Soviet view, support Execution. We believe that subsequent air operationsthe strategic operation in the theater only indirectly would be conducted similarly to the initial convention-and would not be planned by the high command (see al air operation, but on a smaller scale. The targets ofappendix A for a brief discussion of these missions). subsequent air operations would in most cases be located in smaller geographic areas, and probably Subsequent Air Operations only one or two penetration corridors would be re- n .r .n quired through NATO's forward air defenses-con-After either successful initial air defense and air siderably reducing the amount of support needed fromoperations to attain strategic air supremacy or an the front air forces. initial massed nuclear strike, the Soviets intend to call on strategic aviation to conduct a variety of-other We have not observed the detailed si latinofoffensive air operations in support of strategic objec- subsc uent _air operatio tives in the TMO. An air operation is any strategic ut we n a som onnc lannn fr aviation operation in which the main forces of at least one sue operation one air army conduct a series of massed conventional hliesecond air operatio asor nuclear strikes to achieve a specific objective of the ntaally planned by the Wes rn ig command tostrategic operation in the theater, either alone or in be executed upon completion of the initial air opera-conjunction with other forces. Such operations would tion and was to consist of at least three massed airhave the greatest impact in a protracted conventional raids by the Legnica and Smolensk strategic airwar, because air forces constitute the only means of armies. The apparent objective of this operation wasquickly bringing substantial firepower to bear on to reduce the size of NATO's strategic second-echelonimportant deep targets. Soviet military writings assert forces and to interdict key transportation choke pointsthat air operations could be conducted to destroy key to impair NATO's ability to reinforce or withdraw thedefense industrial facilities, to destroy reserve forces forces of Northern Army Group and Central Armyand materiel, to interdict supply shipments, to disrupt Group. Most of the targets were elements of severalcivil and military command and control, and to French army cor s that were notionally still locatedperform special tasks in support of individual fronts, inside France Other targets includedfleets, or airborne troops bridges and possibly dams in the FRG, railroad stations, rear airfields, and naval bases. We did notParticipants. Soviet military writings suggest that air observe the full details of the Soviet scheme ofoperations always have been considered the main execution. form of combat for strategic aviation, The extent and composition of strategic aviation's participation in an If the Pact saw a continuing need to minimize losses by flying relatively short-range low-altitude penetra-oviet nationat strategic reserve forces inctude Military Transport flight profiles, and, if Pact ground attack regi-Aviation, the airborne divisions, the SRF armies, and the SSBN o flotillas, as well as those strategic air armies and ground forces and ments were still located at their main operating bases,front aviation formations that have not beenoperationally i como- Soviet operational planning factors suggest that therated into the strategic force grouping in oneof the TMOs. depth of major air operations would probably not 50
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.