Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Cooper”4 pages
To Secret All aircraft would again clear the shallow part of the preempting, and they may rationalize potential air strike zone to avoid ground forces missile and nuclear losses of this magnitude with the doctrinal consider- artillery restrikes that typically are planned for 60 to ation that air forces would play a decidedly dimin- 70 minutes after H-hour. Strikes by Smolensk strate- ished role once the transition to unlimited nuclear war gic air army medium bombers would probably follow had been made. at two hours or more after H-hour. Medium bomber poststrike reconnaissance of earlier SRF strikes and In a war that began with a massive nuclear exchange final reconnaissance for SRF follow-on strikes would the effectiveness of Pact SSM strikes against deploy- probably coincide with the Smolensk strategic air ing NATO forces would be impaired because the army strikes-with results being passed by radio Soviets probably would have to conduct the strike (figure 13). The SRF follow-on strikes could then largely without precise target location data from finalbegin about four hours after H-hour. reconnaissance. Even in circumstances where final reconnaissance missions could be flown before the strikes, Soviet radio communications needed to passProblems of the Air Forces the reconnaissance results could be jammed The Warsaw Pact air forces would probably have only limited success in finding NATO's concealed mobile SSMs, as they would have to rely primarily on visual Once under way, additional problems would remainsightings. This would hamper their ability to effec- for the Soviets in completing the initial massed nucle-tively perform final reconnaissance for the front mis- ar strike. The large number of units involved and thesile forces, and it would frustrate their attempts to precise timing required to fit aircraft strikes betweenattack-NATO's nuclear forces with conventional the SSM strikes could strain Pact airspace manage-weapons in hopes of disrupting pre aratinnsloran ment capabilities, The damage to aircraft and flash-unanticipated NATO first strike blinding of pilots flying through areas just hit by missiles would probably take their toll. The timing ofSoviet concepts for employing air forces during the events could also deprive the Smolensk strategic airinitial massed nuclear strike in the Western TMO army strike aircraft of front air force support whenalso appear to confront the Warsaw Pact air forces penetrating surviving NATO air defenses, therebywith several aircraft attrition and procedural prob- increasing their losses. Finally, after a nearly simulta-lems. If the Soviets choose to conduct a complete neous exchange. the destruction of Pact airfields anddispersal and standdown to prepare for nuclear strikes command and control centers would be a majorand if the dispersal airfields are targeted, they in- problem in recovering and reconstituting the strikecrease their vulnerability to a preemptive NATO force SSM strike. Alternatively, if they elect to reduce the number of air-delivered strikes so that they can search NATO rear areas for SSMs immediately before the Other Air Force Roles in Direct Support of Strategicnuclear strike, they would expose large numbers of Operations nuclear-capable aircraft to largely intact NATO air defenses. Soviet military writings state that the air forces would perform other roles-in addition to the initial massedWarsaw Pact aircraft also would be particularly nuclear strike and attainment of air supremacy-invulnerable to NATO SSM strikes during a nearly direct support of the high commarnd's strategic objec-simultaneous nuclear exchange because they typically tives in the TMO. These include subsequent airare not permitted to begin takeoffs soon enough to all operations against various classes of targets in NATOget off the ground before the first.Pact SSM7hunches. rear areas, participating in major airborne landingFront air force attrition as high as 70 percen ndicates the vrers awareness of Dis problem. Acceptance of such attri- tion probably reflects their belief that it is the un- avoidable price for not jeopardizing their chances of 49 Top ecret
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.