Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Headquarters”10 pages
Too Secret Figure 13 Execution of a Typical Initial Massed Nuclear Strike by the Western High Command- Subordinate Air Forces- Echelon: Support Strike Third Roles Final reconnaissance Nuclear strikes Nuclear reserve Fighter sweeps Fighter cover Fighter cover Defense suppression Defense suppression Final reconnaissance Time over target H-90 to 11.30 and 11+15 to H+20 to H+45 minutes 11+25 to H+90 (11-start) H+45 minutes minutes Force distribution Most reconnaissance aircraft Nearly all light bombers Less than 5 percent of light 33 percent of fighters 60 to 65 percent of bombers and About 33 percent of Fighter-bombers fighter-bombers fighter-bombers 33 percent of fighters 33 percent of fighters Typical force compositiono 175 Reconnaissance aircraft 180 Light bombers 335 Fighters 235 Fighters 420 Fighter-bombers 5 Light bombers 220 Fighter-bombers 235 Fighters 20 Fighter-bombers 50 Reconnaissance aircraft Note: Italics indicate primaryrolesin the strike. a Targets within the strike demarcation line except those covered by the Baltic Sea Fleet. b We assumesuficient time to readythe full strikeforce. a three-front force disposition, subordinatlon of the LegnicaSAA to the Westernhigh command,nonparticipatioti yr nationalair defensefighters, no prior attrition, and operationalreadinessratesof theair forcesas in table3. The strike echelon, composed of about a third of the strike aircraft typically also would be accompanied by fighters, nearly all of the light bombers, approximate- one or more conventionally armed defense suppression ly two-thirds of the fighter-bombers, and the remain- aircraft. The third echelon would contain the small ing reconnaissance aircraft would follow minutes lat- airborne nuclear reserve force (to strike newly detect- er. They would deliver their nuclear strikes between ed and surviving targets) and the remaining third of about 20 and 45 minutes after H-hour, provide ac- the fighters (charged with guarding the safe recovery companying top cover, and perform final reconnais- of the first two echelons at the conclusion of the sance for the upcoming second strike of the ground mission) forces missiles and nuclear artillery. Each group of Top\Secret 48
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.