Warsaw Pact Air Forces: Support of Strategic Operations in Central Europe, CIA/DI/SOVA Intelligence Assessment, January 1985.

V
To Secret
be maintained at the outset of conventional combat if to two hours before H-hour and ending about 30there wcrcear indications from intlligence that minutes bfore H-hour. Final reconnaissance wouldNATO had not bcgun to make preparations that consist mainly of radio-relayed visual checks to con-would permit launch of a major nuclcarstrjkeo firm or pinpoint the locations of previously identifiedshort notic he targets. All reconnaissance aircraft and any conven-front air for a uc ar reserve orce was approximate- tionally armed fighter-bombers still hunting forly doubled to about 20 to 30 percent of the remaining NATO SSMs would attempt to clear the strike areastrike aircraft once the General Staff or the Western not later than about 10 minutes beforeH-hour. Thehigh command had determined that NATO was likely SRF MR/IRBMs would launch at H-hour, followedto launch its first major nuclear strike within about 24 immediately by the SRBMs and nuclear artillery ofhours. -the fronts (whose strikes would be completed by 10
minutes after H-hour).
The timing of the first takeoffs of the air forces during
the execution of the initial massed nuclear strike
could vary. During the early 1970s the Soviets prohib-
ited takeoffs before H-hour, apparently to avoid com-
promising the element of surprise in the first SSMtn twe ate 1970s, however, mili- strikes. This prohibition may still apply in casensvheretary writing began to reflect high-level they judge tactical surprise to be criticalconcern with e prowiems of disrupting NATO's
final preparations for an unanticipated first nuclear
strike by attempting to destroy its-delivery vehicles in a decliiijyther expectations o tcr ability
the period immediately preceding a nearly simulta- to successfully preempt NATO and, hence, a reducedneous nuclear exchange. Such action would depart requirement for tactical surprise.from the Soviet doctrinal precept that the initial
massed nuclear strike should use maximum force, Military writings indicate that the Soviets intend tobecause the disruptive attacks would be made by some commit their front air forces (and probably forward-of the front aircraft and missiles that would have b,.sed strategic aviation aircraft) to battle in the initialotherwise preparcd to deliver the nuclear strike. 7 massed nuclear strike in three successive echelons if
there is time to assemble the full strike force (figure
13). The first group, called the support echelon, wouldStrike Sequence. The exact sequence and timing of operate in two separate time blocks and would includeevents in the -xccution of the initial massed nuclear most of the reconnaissance aircraft, about a third ofstrike would, of course, depend on the situation. The the fighters, and about one-third of the fighter-
following sequence is based on Soviet writing= bombers (most performing in a reconnaisshnce role).
nd reflects our estimate of Soviet planning The reconnaissance sorties would be flown more thanfor cases in which there is time to assemble the full half an hour before the first SRBM launches. The
strike force for a successful premption, remainder of the support echelon would immediately
precede the strike aircraft into the target area after
the initial msiesrk odsrysriigS~By about two or three hours before the intended start and air defense control centers with conventional
time (H-hour), all forces would be ordered to begin weapons, conduct fighter sweeps over NATO territo-
their final preparations to execute the initial massed ry, and establish fighter blockades over surviving
nuclear strike plans. If conventional combat had interceptor airfields.
already occurred, final reconnaissance of the nuclear
strike targets would be performed by most of the
reconnaissance aircraft and as much as one-third of
the ground attack aircraft, beginning one and a half
47 Toicecrr