Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Sea”15 pages
V To Secret be maintained at the outset of conventional combat if to two hours before H-hour and ending about 30there wcrcear indications from intlligence that minutes bfore H-hour. Final reconnaissance wouldNATO had not bcgun to make preparations that consist mainly of radio-relayed visual checks to con-would permit launch of a major nuclcarstrjkeo firm or pinpoint the locations of previously identifiedshort notic he targets. All reconnaissance aircraft and any conven-front air for a uc ar reserve orce was approximate- tionally armed fighter-bombers still hunting forly doubled to about 20 to 30 percent of the remaining NATO SSMs would attempt to clear the strike areastrike aircraft once the General Staff or the Western not later than about 10 minutes beforeH-hour. Thehigh command had determined that NATO was likely SRF MR/IRBMs would launch at H-hour, followedto launch its first major nuclear strike within about 24 immediately by the SRBMs and nuclear artillery ofhours. -the fronts (whose strikes would be completed by 10 minutes after H-hour). The timing of the first takeoffs of the air forces during the execution of the initial massed nuclear strike could vary. During the early 1970s the Soviets prohib- ited takeoffs before H-hour, apparently to avoid com- promising the element of surprise in the first SSMtn twe ate 1970s, however, mili- strikes. This prohibition may still apply in casensvheretary writing began to reflect high-level they judge tactical surprise to be criticalconcern with e prowiems of disrupting NATO's final preparations for an unanticipated first nuclear strike by attempting to destroy its-delivery vehicles in a decliiijyther expectations o tcr ability the period immediately preceding a nearly simulta- to successfully preempt NATO and, hence, a reducedneous nuclear exchange. Such action would depart requirement for tactical surprise.from the Soviet doctrinal precept that the initial massed nuclear strike should use maximum force, Military writings indicate that the Soviets intend tobecause the disruptive attacks would be made by some commit their front air forces (and probably forward-of the front aircraft and missiles that would have b,.sed strategic aviation aircraft) to battle in the initialotherwise preparcd to deliver the nuclear strike. 7 massed nuclear strike in three successive echelons if there is time to assemble the full strike force (figure 13). The first group, called the support echelon, wouldStrike Sequence. The exact sequence and timing of operate in two separate time blocks and would includeevents in the -xccution of the initial massed nuclear most of the reconnaissance aircraft, about a third ofstrike would, of course, depend on the situation. The the fighters, and about one-third of the fighter- following sequence is based on Soviet writing= bombers (most performing in a reconnaisshnce role). nd reflects our estimate of Soviet planning The reconnaissance sorties would be flown more thanfor cases in which there is time to assemble the full half an hour before the first SRBM launches. The strike force for a successful premption, remainder of the support echelon would immediately precede the strike aircraft into the target area after the initial msiesrk odsrysriigS~By about two or three hours before the intended start and air defense control centers with conventional time (H-hour), all forces would be ordered to begin weapons, conduct fighter sweeps over NATO territo- their final preparations to execute the initial massed ry, and establish fighter blockades over surviving nuclear strike plans. If conventional combat had interceptor airfields. already occurred, final reconnaissance of the nuclear strike targets would be performed by most of the reconnaissance aircraft and as much as one-third of the ground attack aircraft, beginning one and a half 47 Toicecrr
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.