Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“The Advance”13 pages
Table 6 Aircraft With Nuclear Roles Typically Available to the Western High Command, Mid-1983 a Formation Number of Nationality Unit Aircraft Number ofRegiments Type Type Aircraft In-place forces - Legnica strategic air army (SAA) 6 Soviet Light bomber Fencer b 80 GSFG-GDR Front Air Force (FAF) I Soviet Light bomber Fencer 30 7 Soviet Fighter-bomber Fitter DK, Flogger BDJ, 315 and Fishbed K I n German Fighter-bomber Flogger H 20Czechoslovak-CGF FAF 2 Czechoslovak Fighter-bomber Flogger H and Fitter A 85 ___1 * Czechoslovak Fighter-bomber FishbediX 40 Polish-GDR FAF 2 Polish Fighter-bomber Fitter C and Fitter A 55Baltic Fleet Air Force (AF) 3 d Soviet Medium bomber Backfire and Badger 60 I Soviet Fighter-bomber Fitter C 40 Total in-place forces -- Possible reinforcement forces - Vinnitsa SAA 6 Soviet Light bomber Fencer b 190Belorussian FAF 3 Soviet Fighter-bomber Flogger DJ, Fitter A, 135 and Fishbed Carpathian FAF 4 Soviet Fighter-bomber Fitter CK, Flogger DJ, 180 and Fitter A Baltic FAF 4 Soviet Fighter-bomber Flogger DJ, Fitter A, 180 and Fishbed Total reinforcement forces 685 Total forces asatlable 1,510 "Thin tabte doesnot include more than 1,000 Soviet tactical These two units probably have nuclear roles, but this hasnot beenfighter-interccptors that are capable of delivering nuclear weapons confirmed. but annennedto haveonly an emergency-reserve nuclear role. Also d We estimate that the three medium bomber regiments in thenot included are about 265 mediam bombers in the ttrke regiments missile strike air division of the Baltic Sea Fleet AF have nuclearof the Smolenk SAA. e estimate that about three-quarters of the roles but that the Blinders and Badgers of the medium bombermedium bomber strikes might be taaked to be delivered in the reconnaissance regiment would probably perform reconnaissanceWestern TMO againstMOrgets that are located deeper than the and penetration support missions. We cannot rule out the possibili-TMO high command's area of direct control in the initial massed ty, however, that someof the aircraft in the reconnaissancenuclear strike, but for.which the high command may have target regiment also could be usedto conduct nuclear strikes, nomination responsibilities. bThe Legnicv and Vinnitsa SAAs each had one regiment in the process of converting from fighter-bombers to Fencer light bombers. If the initial massed nucle ir strike followed a pro- are believed to be trained in nuclear delivery tech- tracted period of conventional conflict with heavy niquesijrhe ground attack aircraft that would nor- losses of nuclear delivery aircraft, the Soviets could, if mally perform reconnaissance and defense suppres- necessary, draw on'the large pool of other front air , forces aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons. These include most Soviet fighter-interceptors-al- though only about one-third of Soviet fighter pilots 45 Top"Secret
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.