Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Roe”1 page
Top S cret suppression attacks and by augmenting the dedicated The remaining aircraft of the front air forces wouldreconnaissance aircraft. If the light bombers of the fly missions in su port of strike operations slVinnitsa strategic air army also were assigned to the 15 to 20 percent of the ground Western TMO at the time of the strike, we estimate attack aircraft would use conventional weapons to they might be tasked to deliver as many as 200 attack NATO SAMs that had survived earlier War-additional nuclear strikes, saw Pact SSM strikes and provide for a small air-Oborne nuclear reserve force to strike any newly detect-On the basis of an examination of its force composi- ed NATO SSMs. The remaining 30 to 35 percent oftion and missions, we believe that the Smolensk the fighter-bombers apparently would support thestrategic air army would be tasked to deliver between strike by augmenting the dedicated reconnaissance240 and 320 nuclear weapons in the Western TMO aircraft. during the initial massed nuclear strike (see appendix B). Our best estimate is that about 135 aircraft would Soviet military writings attempt to deliver about 290 weapons, assuming no suggest t at prior attrition. This estimate assumes that, instead of ovicts wouta consi cr re uctmg t te number of delivering nuclear weapons, about 25 percent of the strikes by front air forces in their initial massedpotential strike aircraft would be used to conduct nuclear strike if they unexpectedly discovrerd thatsupporting conventional attacks and to augment the NATO was, in their judgment, about to attempt adedicated reconnaissance units and that about 75 surprise first nuclear strike, while the Pact lackedpercent of the strikes of that air army would be time to ready its own nuclear strike forces to res applied in the Western TMO.Q massive to threaNAT n ke preparationsJon massveltotheA wTthrthisparatins. ur Front Aviation. We believe the three-to-five front air the ovicts would free perhaps ast muchas two-thirdsforces that could be available in the Western TMO at of the front air forces' ground attack aircraft to locatethe outset of a war could be tasked to deliver between and attack NATO nuclear forces and command cen-250 and 400 nuclear wea ons durijthcjnitiaJ ters in conjunction with less numerous attacks by.assednuclear strike ground forces missile and artillery forces. Sovietthe Soviets expect these numbers to decline writings indicate that these attacks would occur dur-in proportion to aircraft losses if a period of conven- ing the transitional period immediately before thetional combat preceded nuclear strikes. Our estimate nuclear strike, using conventional and, possibly, someof the numbers of nuclear weapons likely to be chemical weapons. The purpose of such attacks woulddelivered by front air forces is based on the numbers be to disrupt and delay NATO's strike preparations,of aircraft likely to make up the front air forces in a thereby buying time for the Pact to at least salvage athree-to-five-front campaign in the Western TMO nearly simultaneous nuclear exchange using a largeand on planning norms use nucle- strike force. It would also be intended to reduce thear role aircraft are listed in table ).bse norms magnitude of the coming NATO nuclear strike. Th-indicate that about 50 percent of the operationally possible reductions in the number of front air forceready lighter-bombers and about 75 percent of the nuclear strikes could be partially ofrsct by the in-ready light bombers usually would be tasked to creased number of nuclear strikes lannedl orroundconduct nuclear strikes in an initial massed nuclear forces artillery unit td bystrike. These percentages represent about 20 targets the availability of a eceny expanded stratec avia-for each Soviet ground attack regiment in the front tion light bomber force air forces at the outset of war (assuming operational readiness rates of 90 to 95 percent) and somewhat lower numbers of targets for non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) units, because of their smaller unit strengths and lower readiness rate standard of 85 percent. Tur-Sert44
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.