Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Roe”1 page
Taop~Secret Strike Responsibilities. Targets short of the strike would be the primary targets of the Smolensk strate-demarcation line normally would be assigncd to gic air army. Soviet planning factors imply thatground forces short-range ballistic missiles (SRt Ms) medium bombers can cover all targets in the mid-and nuclear artillery. the front air forces, the forward- European, French, and British strategic zones usingbased strategic aviation light bombers, and possibiy to the higher altitude flight profiles that would bea small number of front-allocated SRF warheads. The suitable in the permissive air defense environmenttime-urgent first-priority targets-NATO's nuclear that might follow the air defense suppression strikesforces and installations and its most important com- by SSMs (see figure 11) mand and control facilities-would be -truck primari- ly by ground forces missile and artillery forces, which Likely targets of strategic aviation medium bombersalso would conduct extensive air defense suppression include operational and strategic reserve forces andstrikes. Nuclear strikes delivered by front air forces materiel, transshipment roints and key communica- and forward-based strategic aviation light bombers tions nodes, military-political command and adminis-would be within about 150 km of the FEBA and trative centers, military-industrial facilities, and-ifwould be directed against mobile targets, targets of the air force of the Baltic Sea Fleet required augmen-secondary priority, and particularly important targets tation-aircraft carrier battle groups in the Northpreviously struck by SRBMs. The depth of airstrikes Sea. Medium bomber targets are not likely to bewould be limited by the location of the demarcation time-urgent, because the flight time from bases in theline, the permitted aircraft takeoff times, the time of western USSR to their targets typically would exceedflight to and from targets, and by the relative brevity two hours. Soviet writings suggest that mediumof the period between the first and second ground. bombers are not to take off before the first SRFforces missile and-artillery strikes in which theair- launch, presumably to avoid compromising the cle-strikes would occur ment of surprise. Their later arrivals at targets in the strike sequence would also allow the medium bombersAircraft would beused against mobile targets because to avoid passing through front strikes being deliveredthe Soviets believe pilots re uire less n ecise target- in the shallow strike zone. locating data than SSMs ircraft usual- ly are directed to deliver tne majority of the Pact Participants strikes against NATO's first- and second-echelon The Soviets expect that the initial massed nucleardivisions and the command posts of the first-echelon strike in the Western TMO would entail a maximumarmy corps. This task consumes most of the air- effort by ballistic missile units of the SRF, aircraftdelivered weapons in the shallow strike zone, because from the first-echelon front and fleet air forces and atthe Soviets typically target about a dozen nuclear least two strategic air armies, and ground forcesbombs against each NATO divisionEiAircraft also missiles and nuclear artillery frequently are used to restrike Lance and Pershing SSM units. Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Artillery. In execut- ing an initial massed nuclear strike, the Soviets wouldTargets beyond the strike demarcation line would be rely on the SRF and the ground forces missile andassigned mostly to the SRF and to the medium artillery forces for strikes against time-sensitive, pre-bombers of the Smolensk strategic air army and the cisely located targets throughout the theater. WeBaltic Fleet. Those targets for which sufficiently estimate that the SRF might deliver about 600 to 700precise target-locating data were available would be MR/IRBM warheads and an undetermined (buttargeted primarily by SRF missile units. Mobile probably rather small) number of ICBM strikes in thetargets, targets of lower priority, and the most impor- Western TMO (table 5) tant SRF targets that were to be restruck probably = the missile forces o the act's three irst-echelon TSecret 42
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.