Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Mission Control”9 pages
T0 Secret paramount importance, Soviet planners treat it sc a- aviation light bombers that have been made opera-rately from the more limited subsequent striks.L tionally subordinate to the Western high command it is always at least TMO- (figure 12). While this command would oversee plan- wide in scope and usually is carried out simultaneous- ning for strikes short of the demarcation line, its ly with or within several hours of similar strikes in responsibilities for targets be ond he-line are not other TMOs-usually including North Americal known. Tenuous evidenc owever Thc Soviets believe that successful execution would suggests that the high command may designate or atdestroy or neutralize most major enemy military least nominate targets beyond the line to the General targets in a single stroke; thus, this strike probably Staff-which seems reasonable, because the highwould determine the outcome of the campaign in the command would be responsible for monitoring and theater and possibly of the entire war attacking most of those targets both before and after the initial massed nuclear strike. Planning the strike demarcation line Probably because it has the greatest potential to probably would be set about 100 to 200 km forward ofdecide the outcome of a war, the initial massed the FEBA and approximately parallel to it." The nuclear strike receives first priority in staff activity at General Staff probably would move the line as neces-all levels and is centrally directed by the General sary to keep pace with the movement of the FEBA- Staff. The nuclear planning groups at front, fleet, and perhaps as frequently as once a day during a rapidly presumably high command headquarters would plan moving Pact offensive. Thus, for example, most the distribution of groups of targets among the opera- NATO tactical airbases in the FRG probably woutitional-level strike forces assigned to their sectors of be assigned as targets to SRF MR/IRBMs at theresponsibility. Nuclear planning groups in these strike outset of the war, but they would normally be reas- forces would assign specific targets to individual signed to front Scud SRBMs a few days into the Pact strike units. These assignments would be adjusted offensive, after the strike demarcation line was movedcontinually on the basis of evidence from reconnais- westward. Datr indicate that the area sance of the detection, destruction, or movement of within the demarcation line is subdivided for planning targets.'6 purposes into regional target clusters that are assigned to individual-divisions of fighter-bombers or lightThe Nuclear Strike Demarcation Line. Planning for bombers. We assume that this procedure probably the initial massed nuclear strike in the Western TMO applies to assigning targets beyond the demarcation is coordinated according to sectors of responsibility, line as well.i separated in depth by a strike demarcation line designated by the General Staff. The line specifies the "The strike demarcation line was located at a depth of about too western limit of strikes by front-subordinate forces- km in plans made before hostilitics Planners may have and probably also by most forward-based strategic assumed that NATO wasin a relatively shallow offensive force disposition and that Warsaw Pact Scud SRBMs were farther away from the FEBA is a deeper defensive posture. This situation would place Soviet front SSMs at longer ranges from their potential targets, and most of those targets would be concentrated close to the FEBA, dictating a shallow strike demarcation line. the demarcation line is the mi sto a act conventional offensive, the line was located at a depth of about 200 km. In this case, the Scuds may have been deployed forward to keep pace with the other advancing front forces, and their NATO target: may have beenin a deeper defensive disposition. Tisc-r't , 40
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.