Warsaw Pact Air Forces: Support of Strategic Operations in Central Europe, CIA/DI/SOVA Intelligence Assessment, January 1985.

ToSeeret
massed air raids-before it accomplished its objective if the Soviets chose to start the war with the initial air
of attaining air supremacy in the TMO. This high operation, achievement of tactical surprise would be
attrition would be likely because: dillicult. We believe that massed takeoffs of hundreds
of medium bombers from rear area bases one and a
- Target-locating uncertainties would limit damage to half to two hours before the front air forces and the
NATO's technically advanced air defense system by approach of the bombers to NATO territory could be
the ground forces artillery and missile attacks with detected
conventional munitions, which would immediately and failing that, the bombers
precede the attempts by Pact aircraft to penetrate could be detected by NATO AWACS aircraft by
NATO airspace. about the time they reached Poland. Warning of the
attack could allow NATO suflicient time to launch
- NATO AWACS aircraft and lookdown/shootdown most of its aircraft, exacerbating potential Pact air-
interceptors would limit the opportunities for Pact craft attrition and making the NATO airtields less
aircraft to evade NATO defenses by flying at low lucrative targets
altitudes.
If NATO were able to launch large numbers of
- The Soviet deep attack force would rely heavily on aircraft before the Pact attack, the Pact would have to
medium bombers, which are relatively large, up rely heavily on fighter sweeps and escorts to destroy
maneuverable, and hence particularly vulnerable to them. Pact air forces are poorly equipped to conduct
SAMs and interceptors once identified. fighter sweeps over NATO rear areas, however, be-
cause of limitations in the technical capabilities of
. Fighter-bombers would be extensively exposed to air their Flogger and Fishbed fighters and the inadequate
defenses while they searched NATO rear areas for training of their fighter pilots for this mission. This
mobile SSMs. problem could be partially rectified in the late 1980s
or early 1990s with the deployment of substantial
- Any bombers used in attacks against Britain would numbers of the SU-27 Flanker ;and to a lesser extent
have to operate beyond the range of fighter sweeps MIG-29 Fulcrum) fighters, AWACS aircraft, and an
and fighter escorts, and without air defense suppres- all-aspect infrared-guided air-to-air missile.E
sion support by front forces.
Finally, the large number of aircraft that the Soviets
- The proliferation of hardened aircraft shelters at intend to use in the first massed air raid probably
NATO airbases would force the Soviets to concen- would strain Pact airspace management capabilities
trate on closing runways without the benefit of ood and lead to confusion. Additionally, bad weather
runway attack munitions (according to data would limit the size and effectiveness of the air raids
thus requiring more air raids over or even force the postponement of the air operation at
a longer period of time and hence greater exposure the outset of hostilities, thus compromising the cle-
to-NATO air defenses. ment of surprise.
- The Soviets do not have enough hardened shelters to
protect most of the aircraft that would deploy The Initial Massed Nuclear Strike
forward from the western USSR in the event of a
massive reinforcement. We doubt that a large-scale In their writings, the Soviets define the initial massed
reinforcement by front aviation would be likely nudear strike as the first full-scale nuclear exchange
under most circumstances, however, until the of a war and characterize it as the most decisive of allground forces of the affected second-echelon fron s military actions. Because its efective execution is of
also deployed forward.
39 T ."-Sat