Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
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Te Secret the Soviets would plan for diverting more sorties away several penetration corridors through NATO's for-from airfield attacks if there were a substantial ward air defenses by using fighter-bombers in con-increase in the SSM threat junction with artillery and SRBMs in direct attacks and by performing extensive electronic jamming (see\i Soviets used strategic figure 10). The Soviets' military writings indicate thataviation hg tbom ers and medium bombers to attack they have substantially increased the role of artilleryPershing 11MRBMs and Tomahawk GLCMs. Such and SRBMs armed with conventional cluster war-use of Fencers indicates that the recent deployment of heads in defense suppression since 1980, but we are these weapons in Central Europe may have already uncertain of the planned extent of thcir_ra.ricinaimcaused them to plan for diverting additional aircraft We m at away from airfield attack missions. the u rn the western MO Al Dl-conduct forward air defense suppres-Air Defense Suppression. Air defense suppression sion with the fire of more than 1,700 artillery tubeswould play an important part in satisfying both the and roughly 30 conventionally armed SS-21 or FROGbasic goals and the immediate tactical requirements SRBMs to support the first Pact air attacks in the airof the initial air operation. As strategic air supremacy defense operation-but we do not know whether thisis supposed to provide the Warsaw Pact air forces -icalof Soviet planning norms. Greater continuous freedom of action over NATO territory, use of ground forces SRBMs to suppress NATO airdegrading NATO's air defenses is one of the goals of defenses could free many fighter-bombers from thesethe operation. A more immediate tactical require- duties to perform other missions, such as attackingment, however, would be attaining suflicient localized airfields and locating and destroying NATO SSMair defense suppression to achieve short-term "opera- launchers. tional"~ air supremai~cy. This would be a prerequisite for keeping bomber attrition rates low enough to three or four penetration corr- complete a protracted air operation. (ors t trough the NATO Hawk belt probably would be established in a TMO-wide air raid, but weEvidence military writings sug- estimate that only one or two would be used in eachgests that the oviets are prepared to accept only 5- to air raid when concentrated sector attacks were con-10-percent losses on any one massed air raid, that ducted. Soviet writing typically havethey probably plan on average attrition rates of only 2 portrayed these penetration corridors as being 50 to to 3 percent per massed raid for the first few days of 60 km wide and have suggested that each corridorthe war, and that they expect these rates to decline to could accommodate three to five parallel lanes of airabout I percent per sortie thereafter. Attrition as high traflic (about 10 to 15 km apart). We estimate thatas 7 or 8 percent has sometimes been depicted for the the Soviets may plan for over 800 aircraft to use cachfirst massed sortie of the war, however. Although of the two central corridors in a first TMO-widethese attrition rates are similar to the historical record massed air raid and that more than 1,300 aircraftof US bomber losses over Germany in World War II might use the main corridor in a concentrated sectorand of Israeli aircraft losses in the 1973 Middle East attack. war, we believe that these rates probably are optimis- tically low for a modern, high-intensity war in Central Deeper attacks would also be conducted against airEurope, considering the great density and lethality of defense command and control facilities, and fighter-air mdefenseson both sides interceptors would perform fighter sweeps, barrier patrols, and airfield blockades to counter NATOIn an attempt to achieve these optimistically low rates interceptors. Finally, the main attack force wouldof attrition, up to half the aircraft participating in the initial air operation could be used primarily against NATO air defenses and command and control facili- ties. The front forces would be directed to establish TipaSeret 36
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.