Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Cooper”4 pages
Top Secret Soviet military writings indicate that during the air operation is by attacking aircraft the preferred targets at NATO airfields would be carriers operating in the North Sea. This mission aircraft in the open, but the proliferation of hardened would be performed by the medium bombers of the aircraft shelters has caused the Soviets to concentrate Baltic Sea Fleet, although strategic aviation medium much of their emphasis on cutting runways. They also bombers could be called upon to augment the fleet. appear to recognize that resorting to closing runways We doubt, however, that this would constitute a major probably would require more repeat attacks to keep mission for strategic aviation during the curly stages them closed. Their writings have indicated that hard- of a war in the Western TMO because the flect's ened aircraft shelters would be attacked as well, but three missile-armed bomber regiments would not havewe believe that such attacks probably would be to be reinforced for this task under most scenarios.- deferred to the later phases of the air operation, Moscow strategic air army Bear heavy bombers are because they require large numbers of aircraft- responsible for engaging aircraft carrier battle groups typically one fighter-bomber per shelter. Airfield at- in the approaches to the Norwe ian and Greenland tack plans in sonic cases also have included key base seas, but these operations support facilities such as n aintenancelmLe-ind probably would be conducted from the Kola Peninsula ammunition storage areas. in support of the Oceanic, instead of the Western. TMO in the European theater of war. Attacks Against Surface-to-Surface Missiles. NATO's nuclear-armed surface-to-surface missileAir-to-Air and AntishipActivity. The Warsaw Pact forces also would be a major target in the initial airfighter-nterceptor forces would also-be given a major operation, despite their irrelevance to air supremacy role in destroying NATO aircraft through air-to-air and the fact that their attrition evidently is not aengagements during the air operation. Soviet military criterion for the Soviets' success in the initial air writings from the early 1970s estimat^d that NATO operation. We believe that this apparent inconsistency could launch 60 percent of its aircraft before the is explained by the extreme importance that the arrival of the Pact airfield attack aircraft, leading the Soviets give to destroying SSMs, making it a "perma- Soviets to conclude that aerial engagements by the nent task" for the air forces that has to be performed Pact fighters flying top covet were likely to account at all times regardless of other priorities, including for 30 to 40 percent of the NATO aircraft destroyed gaining air supremacy. in the initial air operation. The Soviets probably now estimate that a higher percentage of NATO aircraft Despite their recognition of their limited capability to would have to be destroyed in air-to-air engagements locate and destroy NATO's mobile SSMs and the because the proliferation of hardened shelters at growing conventional capabilities of Pact ground NATO airfields has made it more diflicult to destroy forces missile systems against identified NATO aircraft on the ground, NATO's warning capabilities launchers, the Soviets apparently are prepared to have improved, and because they probably believe devote large numbers of aircraft to the task; Military that a greater share of the struggle for air supremacy writings from the mid-1970s suggested that attackswould be fought over Pact territory if NATO seized against SSMs (primarily on-alert launchers) should the initiative in the air at the war's outset. Renewed consume about 40 percent of the fighter-bomber Soviet interest in fighter training for bomber escort sorties and about 20 percent of the light-bomber missions and the development of an aircraft that sorties in the initial air operation. Concern about appears to be well suited to conducting fighter sweeps destroying NATO SSMs is so great that we believe(the SU-27 Flanker) suggest that top cover for the operation is being given greater emphasis. The other way that the Soviets expect to reduce the , size of the NATO air forces in the Western TMO 35 secret
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.