Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Mission Control”9 pages
To "Secret substantial numbers of NATO aircraft on the ground squadrons, comprising about 17 to 20 aircraft, invari- during the airfield attacks and would reduce Pact ably are used against each airfield. Attacks by Blind- losses to NATO air defenses. Even though they have er or Backfire medium bombers typically have used expressed interest in conducting air raids at night- onl half as many aircraft. Fencer airfield attackQ for which strategic aviation units have trained-to have ranged in size from one to three enhance surprise and impair NATO's air defenses, squadrons (six to 26 aircraft). Fighter-bomber attacks military writers repeatedly have rejected this possibil- on airfields usually use a full regiment (30 to 40 ity. This rejection is because of front aviation's very aircraft), although smaller groups have been used to limited training and target-acquisition capabilities for mine runways as a prelude to the main attack by offensive operations at night. The Soviets instead have another unit shown a preference for conducting the massed air raids at around dawn and dusk. Their The Soviets probably do not now intend to supplement writings have noted that the massed raids could be aircraft attacks against NATO airfields with major spaced as little as seven hours apart, however, with ground forces missile attacks using conventional clus- the limiting factor being the time required for the ter munitions."' Because of the substantial expansion preparation and transit of the medium bomber force that is occurring in the Soviet SRBM force ", its to their targets. growing participation in other aspects of conventional operations, and the ongoing development of a terminal Airfield Atracks. The heart of the initial air operation guidance capability for their SRBMs, however, we would be a series of airfield attacks designed to predict the Soviets may develop a significant airfield destroy a sulfhcient portion of NATO's air forces to attack mission for their ground forces missile forces in establish strategic air supremacy as well as to sub- the 1990s. SRBM-delivered cluster mines could be stantially reduce NATO's nuclear strike potential. used to trap NATO aircraft on airfields immediately Airbases housingfighter-bomber wings with nuclear before the airfield attacks by Pact aircraft, with the strike roles generally are the top-priority targetsj Improved Scud and the SS-23 covering most airbases because their destruction would si- in the FRG and the Scaleboard covering the airbases niultaneously satisfy both objectives. This preference in the Benelux countries and northeastern France. We for attacking fighter-bomber units with nuclear roles have seen no evidence that the Soviets would use also demonstrates the primacy of preparing for nuce- chemical warheads in the air operation and believe ar escalation, however, because the qualitative air they do not intend to do so. balance could be altered much more quickly if the Soviets were to instead concentrate on destroying fighter-interceptors (especially F- I5s), which the Sovi- cts credit with having substantially greater combat potential. Some fighter-interceptor and reconnais- sance bases also would be attacked. Soviet military writings note that front aviation also would make less ambitious attacks against NATO airfields between the massed air raids and outside the framework of the air opceation, because each front commander would be responsible for maintaining pressure on the NATO air forces in his sector of responsibility. The number of Pact aircraft used to attack each airfield has varied from as little as a suadron to as much as a regiment of attack aircraft. involving Badgers, two attack To en 34
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.