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Warsaw Pact Air Forces: Support of Strategic Operations in Central Europe, CIA/DI/SOVA Intelligence Assessment, January 1985.

Central Intelligence Agency · 95 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.

  • p. 7 …option at the outset of war. -- - The deployment of large numbers of these advanced fighters also…
  • p. 21 …Rigid Soviet employment con- deploying advanced F-15s and additional F-l Is.cepts in the…
  • p. 29 …Participants;The initial air defense operation would to anticipate far enough in advance the approximateinvolve more…
  • p. 36 …o the new Blackjack could be more useful in penetrating NATO's technically advanced air defenses…
  • p. 48 …two hours before the front air forces and the NATO's technically advanced air defense system…
  • p. 49 …case, the Scuds may have been deployed forward to keep pace with the other advancing front…
  • p. 62 …or at NATO reserves advancing toward the drop zones. least until the front main forces have…
  • p. 65 …aircraft in the Western TMO probably would with the advancing ground forces of the coastal front…
  • p. 68 Top Secret - The deployment of large numbers of these advanced Introduce jam-resistant communications that could…
  • p. 70 …army groups and an advance to a particular commands. At the apex of this command pyramid…
  • p. 72 …the defeat of the main forces of specific opposing NATO army corps and an advance to…
  • p. 78 …also includes the Baltic Fleet air forces and the they were researching more advanced ways to…
  • p. 91 …The Soviet term for the branch of the cal-level forces and the provision of substantial…
To pSecret
Figure 10 (continued) capable of participating without first deploying to
forward airbases would be medium bombers flying at
high altitudes (and thus vulnerable to air defenses) or
The illustrated medium and heavy bomber flight profiles are heavy bombers.
optim i.ed for defense Penetration and are similar to missions
panned bya Badger regimenl secordingw The area that would be brought inder attack in each
assume that the bombers wou t cu uet avo NATO radar individual massed air raid would be substantialli
detection by operating entirely at low altitudes on both the inbound narrower if the Soviets chose to concentrate theirand outbound segments of their missions while over NApTO
ry and most of the GDR and western Czechislovakia. attacks in sectors to compensate for near parity in the
Soviet planners consider the Fencer to have TMO-wide air balance. Soviet writers have referred
a maximum practical operational flight radius of nearly 700 km. to these sectors only as "operational axes," withoutbut that the aircraft would have to ly at high altitudes, thereby
making themselves vulnerable. to reach targets at that distance. US specifying the extent of the area covered by each. We
technical assessments, however. suggest that the Fencer could fly doubt, however, that they are referring to axes as
considerably farther. For a discussion of the differences between small as the six land axes noted in figure 5. WeSoviet operational planning factors and US technical estimates of
maximum capabilii.- estimate that the most effective plan would be to
divide the TMO into two sectors separated near the
boundary between AAFCE's 2ATAF and 4ATAF
A standart fhght-route structure is likely to be used by USSR- (see appendix C), because two sectors would reduce
based bombers to sin sifv airs ace manaemnjt verPaut erms. the burden of airspace management by providing
rV. room for atsecond penetration corridor in each sector,
scmtms nnltour penetratton cor1Uors assume a TMO-ide allow greater use of front aviation by casing basing
air raid. constraints, and ensure that each sector contained
Ts scca~i enough high-value NATO airfield targets to warrant
committing the force of an entire massed air raid to it.Location and Timig ofAttack
nearly all of the attacks during
at least the first few massed air raids of an initial If the TMO were divided into two sectors, we estimateconventional air operation in the Western TMO prob- that the Soviets would probably prefer an attack
ably would be concentrated in the mid-European sequence in, which they alternated between the twostrategic zone and the North Sea. Most primary sectors a series of operational phases of two massedNATO targets lie in this area within 150 to 400 km of air raids apiece. Although the Soviets clearly couldthe FRG-GDR border and can be struck by strategic increase their effectiveness if they were to hit theand naval aviation medium bombers flying low-alti- same airfields in several consecutive massed air raids,tude defense penetration fight protiles and by for- we doubt that they would want to conduct more thanward-deployed strategic aviation Fencer light bomb- two-or conceivably three-consecutive raids in ancrs flying somewhat less advantageous profiles one sector.
(figure 10).
The Soviets also may intend to attack deeper targets,
such as key airbases in France and Britain during the
initial conventional air operation. Recent military
writings state that the operation would cover an area
about 1,000 km deep and 1.000 to 1,500 km wide-
which would include almost all of Britain and most of
France. The Soviets probably envision conducting
most of the attacks against the deeper targets during The timing of the individual massed air raids would
the later phases of the operation, however, because, be influenced by several operational constraints. Sovi-
according to Soviet planning factors, the only aircraft et military writers often have noted that achieving
some degree of tactical surprise could be critical to
success, because it would allow the Pact to catch
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.