Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Cooper”4 pages
Top Secret Table 4 estimate that only 1,600 to 2,000 of those aircraft Estimated Numbers of Warsaw Pact would be expected to participate in the first massed Combat Aircraft Available To Participate raid, of which 700 to nearly 900 would be ground in the First Massed Air Raid attack aircraft. of the Initial Air Operation- -- -- Ar----- The extent to which fighter-bombers should be usedAttack Fighters Support Total Aircraft Aircraft in the initial air operation rather than in direct Available TMO-wide .255 145 500 2,900 support of the ground forces has been a contentious atthe onset of war'__.___ _-issue among senior Soviet officers since the air opera- 70 to 85 percent 880 to 800 to 350 to 2.030 to tion's inception. Recent Soviet military writingsemployable in one 1.065 975 425 2,465 'nd cate that almost all available fighter- sector attack at the g onset of warb bombers probably would participate in the massed air Available 2002 0 2,340 raids of the initial air operation, leaving only army at end of day two - aviation attack helicopters to provide air support for 70 to 85 percent 715 to 645 to 275 to 1,635 to the ground forces during the air raids." Fighter- employable in one 870 780 350 2,000 bomber air support would be made available to sector attack atend of day twoa ground forces units, however, between massed air * This estimate is taken from the moderate force in table 3 and all raids and presumably during any raids that were numbers have beenrounded to the nearest S. concentrated in distant sectors of the TMO. The bThe actual percent employable would depend on the size and Soviets plan to fly more than one-third of all fighter-location of the sector and its penetration corridors and on the basing locations of the Warsaw Pact forces. Our preliminary analysis bomber sorties between the massed air raids on the suggests that about 70 to 85 percent of the force could be employed first two or three days of a war; thereafter, they wouldin each massed air raid if the TMO is divided into two or three intend to devote over half of the fighter-bombersectors. * This estimate reflects what we believe are highly optimistic Soviet sorties to front and army objectives. Contrary to expectations off r.camikhilitvJateon-dayAwoorcaon_day assertions made in military writings from the mid- three of the wa ,a] l970s, authoritative statements from the early 1980stohiestumate assumes onlyIS-percent . cumu atv attrtiontoW forces in prior combat and a 5-percent indicate that the Soviets probably do not intend to reduction in the operational readiness rate of aircraft. increase air support after the first massed raid by reducing the size of the subsequent massed air raids in the air operation. This shift probably reflects their perception of increased force requirements for meet- ing the objectives of the air operation) belhoever we J behteve the General Staff expects that the Pact proba- ' bly would begin the war with the so-called air defense "Soviet military writings indicate that concern about the possibility operation rather than the air operation, with the result of inadequate direct air support during the initial air operation was large responsible for the massive buildup of army aviation attackthat fewer aircraft probably would be available when helicopter forces that began in the early 1970s. As a result, the the transition to the air operation occurred. These ground forces can now beassured of substantial air support during scenarios have most frequently depicted that transi- the initial air operation. In GSFG, for example, there are now more attack helicopters than fixed-wing ground attack aircraft; calcula-tion as taking place late on the second day or early on tinns using the Soviet method of quantifying combat potential the third day of the war, when cumulative attrition of indicate that the GSFG attack helicopter force is now viewed as Pact aircraft typicanlvhas-been portrayed as only being slightly more powerful than the fighter-bomber force (figure 31.The Soviets therefore probably believe that the present attackabout 15 percent In assuming this highly helicopter force iscapable of providing more air support to the optimistic attrtio --raeTo nd a slight reduction in the GSFG ground forces during the initial air operation than could operational readiness rate of their aircraft, Soviet have been provided by the entire GSFG fighter-bomber force in the planners might hope to have more than 2,300 aircraft early 1970s, when the issue first surfaced. available TMO-wide for the initial air operation at the end of the second day of the war, including approximately 1,000 ground attack aircraft. If they elected to concentrate the massed air raids sequential- ly in two or three sectors of the TMO, however, we 31 7 psecret
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.