Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Headquarters”10 pages
To. Secret Table 3 Estimated Numbers of Warsaw Pact Combat Aircraft - Available TMO-Wide To Participate in the Initial Air Operation at the Outset of War in the Western TMO, mid-1983 a (continued) Assigned Combat-Ready Aircraft Nuclear Alert Available for Combat Air Operation Aircraft Rateb Aircraft Rate' Aircraft (Percent) (percent) Cecchoslovak-CG F FA F Attack 155 85 130 130 Fighter 310d 85 and 95 270 270 -- Support 65 -85 and 95 55 55 Total 4,040 3610 3,610 Attack 1,945 1,740 1,740 Fighter _ 1,535 1,375 1,375 Support 560 495 495 * All numbers have been rounded to the nearest 5 except for the d The numbers of front air force fighters include the colocated nuclear alert force. We assume a TMO-wide massed air raid and "first-echelon" non-Soviet national air defense fighter-interceptors. no prior attrition. There has been no reallocation of forces between eIn the maximum-effort case,we assume that 70 Smolensk SAAthe various peacetime forces that would make up the wartime Badgers and Blinders with primary ECM and reconnaissance rolesfronts. The attack helicopters arc not included because the Soviets are reconfigured to perform attack missions in the air operation.exclude them from the air operatioa Not depicted rThe numbers of Soviet fighters that typically would be incorporat-are front electronic countermeasures (_CM) helicopters and mili- ed into these front air forces can be estimated with only moderatetary transport aviation (VTA) ECM transports that would confidence, participate. We assume that operational readiness rates at the outset of war are 95 percent for Soviet units based in Eastern Europe, 90 percent for Soviet units that deploy forward from the USSR, and 85 percent for NSWP units. ' According to Soviet practice, the tO-percent nuclear resetwe in our moderate estimate is based on authorized unit strengths and, except for the Smolensk SAA, is rounded to one flight per regiment (percent is applied only to units with nuclear roles). In our maximum force estimate the Soviets elect not to have a nuclear reserve of delivery aircraft. We estimate that if the Pact chose to conduct a the outbreak of war-as reflected in recent military TMO-wide offensive air operation at the start of writings that stnte that up to 3,000 aircraft could war-a choice we think less likely than an air defense participate in the initial air operation in the Western operation or an initial offensive air operation using TMO sector attacks-probably about 2,900 aircraft would be available (table 3). Over 1,200 of these aircraft If the Soviets chose to conduct their initial air opera- would come from units with primary missions of tion at the outset of war as a series of sector attacks, ground attack (about 500 from strategic aviation, and rather than across the full width of the TMO, we the rest from the front and fleet air forces). With estimate that the first massed air raid probably would massive mobilization and reinforcement (assuming a involve about 2,000 to 2,500 aircraft, including 900 to total of five first-echelon fronts) and no nuclear 1,100 ground attack aircraft (table 4). This estimate reserve force, we estimate that as many as 3,600 reflects our judgment that basing and penetration aircraft, including over 1,700 ground attack aircraft, corridor constraints would limit participation in each could be available to the Pact for the air operation. massed raid to about 70 to 85 percent of the aircraft We believe, however, that Soviet planners doubt that available for a TMO-wide raid (see appendix C for they would be able to field such a large force before further discussion). 'Topne:ret 30
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.