Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Headquarters”10 pages
Top\Secret Table 3 Estimated Numbers of Warsaw Pact Combat Aircraft Available TMO-Wide To Participate in the Initial Air Operation at the Outset of War in the Western TMO, mid-1983 a Assigned Combat-Ready Aircraft . Nuclear Alert Available for Combat Air Operation Aircraft Rate b Aircraft Rate' Aircraft (percent) (percent) Moderate Force -- - - - - "- - -_ Legnica strategic air army (SAA) ___ Attack 180 90 and 95 165 10 18 145 Fighter 135 - - - 95 130 130 Support 40 95 40 40 Vinnitsa SAA - -Attack __190____ 10 90 170 10 18 150 Fightr 125 90 115 115 Support 40 90 35 35 Smolensk SAA - ' - - - Attack 265 90 240 10 24 215 Support 200 90 180 180 Moscow SAA Attack 25 __20_ 90 20 20 B)altic Fleet Air Force (AF) Attack ___ 135 90 120 10 12 110 _Support 40 90 35 35 Polish-GDR Front Air Force (FAF) ttack 200 85 170 10 8 160 Fighit 200 85 170 170 Support 70 85 60 60 GSFG-GDR FAF - Attack 395 85 and 95 370 10 35 335 Fighter 505 d - 85 and 95 460 460 Support 100 85 and 95 95 95 Czcchoslovak-CG F FA F - Attack 55 85 130 10 12 120 Fighter 310d 8 and 95 270 270 Support_______ 65 85and95 55 55 - Total 3,375 3,9 030 127 2.900 Attack 1,545 1,385 127 1,255 Fighter 1,275 1,145 - -,145 Support __ 555 500 500 Top eSecret 28
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.