Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Cooper”4 pages
Top'Cecret against NATO lighter-intcrceptors[ZHigh attrition European air balance and their recently increased could also result from limited fighter cover and force suflicicncy requirements for the operation. In defense suppression support for strike aircraft--espc- addition to the Legnica and Smolensk strategic air cially the late-arriving medium bombers of the Smo- armies, we believe the Soviets probably would dedi- lensk strategic air army cate the Vinnitsa air army to operations in the Western TMO in the initial period f war if they had The Initial Air Operation sullicient time to deploy it forward.'" The Soviet General Staff still regards the initial air operation as the only means of ultimately establishing air supremacy in the TMO in a conventional war, despite its recent interest in first conducting a so- called air defense operation. Since overall responsibil- \Ve believe the Soviets may also contemp ate ity for the initial air operation was transferred from using some heavy bombers from the Moscow strategic the Soviet Air Forces Main Staff to the wartime high air army in limited attacks against the deepest targets command in the Western TMO in 1980, military in the TMO.' writers have stressed that it must be viewed as a joint forces operation. They have, nevertheless, reaflirmed We doubt, however, that the Soviets intend to rein- that the primary role in destroying NATO's air forces force by detaching the air forces of second-echelon in conventional warfare remains with the Warsaw fronts and committing them to battle more than a Pact air forces. The General Staffs increased involve- couple of days before the front ground forces, as ment probably is responsible for the reduced expecta- heavy aircraft attrition could seriously impair the tion of a quick victory through surprise airfield at- fighting ability of the involved fronts. This belief is tacks and for the recent emphasis on protracted consistent with the inclusion of a fourth front air force brute-force employment concepts that are more char- at the outset of wa vhich has acteristic of Soviet joint forces operating styld coincided with four- ro groun orces dispositions. It also is consistent with statements by senior Soviet military officials that the numbered air armies of Participants. The number of aircraft that would front aviation were disestablished in the 1980 SA F directly participate in the initial air operation would reorganization so that front aviation would be fully be determined by many factors. These include the integrated into the joint forces fronts. state of mobilization and reinforcement, whether the air operation was launched at the outset of hostilities or after attrition had been suffered in the initial air 'If thestrategic aviation Fencer light bombers arc to Participate in defense operation and other combat activity, whether .operations in the Western TMO, Sovict planning factors indicate that they must operate from forward area airfields (which arethte Soviets elected to attack across the entire width of vulnerabic to attacks by NATO fighter-bombers)-and even then the TMO or focus the attacks in smaller sectors, the the Fcncer cannot attack the deepest targets within range of operational readiness rates of the aircraft in combat USSR-based Badgers and Blinders. The Fencers, nevertheless. would be able to respond more quickly and fly more sorties due tounits, the number of aircraft reserved from convcrn- their closer proximity to the targets. Morcover, a Fencer regiment tional operations to serve as a quick-reaction nuclear apparently has 70 to 8Opercent more combat potential than a strike force, and the number of aircraft (if any) that Badger or Blinder regiment-nearly as much as a Backfire regi- ment-according to the Soviet method of estimating relative abilitywould be given other missions during the massed air o inflict tossesonthe enemy. raids. We believe the Soviets would attempt to maximize participation in the operation because of their apper- ent perception of an adverse shift itn the Central . moreovcr, tne ign-spec cas and large payload capa It- ttes o the new Blackjack could be more useful in penetrating NATO's technically advanced air defenses to pressconventional attacks against Western TMO targets than in penetrating those degraded North American air defenses that survived an interconti- nental missile striker 27 To Secret
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.