Warsaw Pact Air Forces: Support of Strategic Operations in Central Europe, CIA/DI/SOVA Intelligence Assessment, January 1985.

TokSecret
defenses could be disrupted because cach sector com- would occur on the ground if NATO achievcd sufli-
mand post would have to contend with fluctuating cient tactical surprise to catch them in an unalerted
mixes of colocated air defense forces from one or two status. Moreover, many of the forward-based attack
fronts, national air defense components, and possibly aircraft that would be able to take olT might be
a strategic air army, while dealing with the basic inadequately armed to successfully perform their in-
problems of coordinating SAM and fighter activities tended tasks. If the medium bombers were not already
and discriminating between hostile and friendly air- armed and alerted, they probably would miss the first
craft. Military writings indicate that the procedures phase of the operation entirely.|
for accomplishing the necessary coordination and
control of fluctuating sector force compositions arc Second, emphasis on the precise execution of closely
still in the developmental stage. Failing to implement timed events and dependence on the immediate opera-
simple, standardized procedures could result in confu- tional exploitation of intelligence information on a
sion and substantial fratricide, grand scale (to attack alternative recovery bases)
would demand extraordinarily clicient staff work at
Target detection may become an increasingly difficult a large number of cooperating headquarters. It would
problem for the Pact air defense system because of also require the maintenance of reliable communica-
NATO's increasing use of aircraft like the US F-I I I tions in a hostile ECM environment and sullicient
and the Anglo-German Tornado that are optimized redundancy to compensate for NATO attacks against
for low-altitude penetration. NATO's extensive use of key communications nodes."
electronic countermeasures and possible introduction
of conventionally armed cruise missiles would compli- Third, if the Pact suffered high attrition or was
cate matters further. These problems may be mitigat- unable to achieve a substantial kill-ratio advantage
ed in the early 1990s, however, if Soviet AWACS and during the initial air defense operation, conditions
new SU-27 Flanker and MIG-29 Fulcrum lookdown/ probably would not be judged by the Soviets as
shootdown fighters are made available in the Western favorable for launching the initial air operation-
TMO in large numbers [. making the attainment of strategic air supremacy
unlikely. Disastrously high attrition could result, be-
The Soviets would face acute execution problems if cause the Pact pilots of the last and most important
they used employment concepts for the ofensive attack wave probably would experience great diflicul-
aspects of the initial air defense o erition similar to ty in avoiding NATO SAM sites and in locating and
the ones that they testc n the iate 197 0s, attacking NATO airfields without the benefit of the
especially if they failed to respond quickly to warnings usual detailed premission study of flight routes and
of impending NATO attack or if they were unable to targets. The final groups of front air force ground
rapidly exploit targeting information. These concepts attack aircraft and strategic aviation light bombers
also appear to risk disastrously high aircraft attri- also would have to fly to their targets at vulnerable,
tion-leading us to speculate that the Soviets may but fuel-eficient, medium altitudes to compensate for
have had to modify this portion of the scheme of the fuel burned while in prestrike aerial holding zones.
execution Our analysis of front aviation training suggests that
this vulnerability would be compounded by the inade-First, when the Soviets plan for the quate training of Pact ground attack pilots to defendcontingency of NATO seizing the initiative in the air
at the outset of war, the Soviets assume that they can
obtain timely intelligence warning of NATO's prepa-
rations to launch its major air at tacks. However,
considerable disruption and high losses of aircraft
[6p scercl 26