Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Sea”15 pages
ToinSecret break up NATO attack formations, increasing their The duration of the initial air defense operation exposure to Pact SAMs by forcing then to deviate ideally would be determined by the Pact's ability to from their planned defense penetration routes. The create "fa'vorable conditions" for launching its initial first intercept line would be located at the maximum air operation (or by the execution of the first major practical distance at which NATO aircraft could be nuclear strike, which would obviate the need for the engaged over NATO territory ahead of Pact SAM initial air operation). While we d9 not know precisely coverage this line has varied in depth for what the Soviets consider favorable conditions, we the most part about 70 to 120 kilometers inside the assume that they would hope to have persuaded FRG border, as depicted in figure 7). The depth of NATO that its counterair attacks were counterpro- this line would be constrained by the extent of Pact ductive: that they would want to have impaired ground-controlled intercept (GCI) coverage and by AAFCE's ability to launch further major air raids the practical flight radii and the reaction times of the that could seriously disrupt the initial Pact air opera- fighters. A second intercept line-the main one- tion; and that they would like to have improved their typically would be established for the air defense first- chances for success with the initial air operation by echelon fighter-interceptors immediately behind the achieving a combat potential advantage in the air zones of responsibility of the forward SAMs. The balance in the TMO of at least 1.4:1. second-echelon fighters would have a forward inter- the transition to the initial air operation cept line just behind the rear boundaries of the first- typically has occurred after about two days of combat, echelon fronts, as well as a final intercept line where a although the Soviets' writings reflect the belief that concerted effort would be made to destroy NATO's they might have to conduct air defense operations for surviving deep intruders. The fighter-interceptors of as long as six days. the first and second air defense echelons could also be assigned zones of responsibility in the Pact's rear The Soviets recognize that circumstances might arise,areas -nd in penetration corridors supporting its however, in which the TMO CinC would feel com- ground attack aircraft pelled to try to seize the strategic initiative after a brief period of inconclusive defensive operations byBecause of its reactive nature, the timing of the launching an integrated ground and air offensive Warsaw Pact massed sorties in the initial air defense before achieving a substantial air balance advantage. operation would be dictated by the commander oi The greater risk of failure involved in transitioning to NATO's Allied Air F rces Central Europe (AAFCE). the initial air operation under these conditions might the Soviets expect NATO to lead the high command to use this option only if they con uct two or three major air raids on the first day judged that air supremacy was no longer essential to of a war and to attempt to conduct about two massed winning the war-for instance, if NATO's political NATO air raids a day for the next couple of days. In resolve were broken or if the Soviets believed that Soviet operational planning, reactions to the first one they had substantial!y overestimated the ability of or two massed NATO air raids would constitute the NATO's air forces to disrupt the Pact ground initial phase of the air defense operation. During this offensive. first phase, the Pact would be more uncertain about the timing and nature of NATO attacks than it would Potential Problems. The Soviets are aware that exe- during subsequent phases. The Soviets expect that cution of the defensive aspects of the initial air there may be insufficient warning for them to use defense operation would place a severe strain on theirtheir medium bombers in their initial response. While airspace management system. They expect that moreSoviet military writings and exercises have focused on than 3,000 Warsaw Pact aircraft and over 2,000 the conduct of air defense operations at the outset of NATO aircraft could take part in the first massed war, we assume that the Pact would also resort to sortie in the Western TMO in a period of only aboutsuch operations later if NATO were able to blunt the two hours. Organization and control of Pact air initial Pact air operation and launch a new NATO air offensive or perhaps if NATO ground forces launched a successful counteroffensive. 25 Sect
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.