Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Roe”1 page
Top'Secret J_1970s-although we speculate that the Soviets may acon-ceptuor organizing the air delense have had to simplify the exceedingly dcmandin orces in the Wes trn TMO-durin an initial air ofTensive portion of the operation dcfensc operation these forces were indicated that a large segment of thc arsaw 'act organized into air deense first and second echelons, fighter force (perhaps about a third) would attempt to The air defense first echelon probably consisted of the engage the lead elements of NATO's attack force as ittactical air defense forces of the first-cchelon fronts entered Pact airspace. Most of the other Pact fighters and the colocated national air defense forces of the and part of the fighter-bombers would be used to GDR and western Czechoslovakia (figure 7). The air intercept subsequent groups of NATO aircraft at a defense second echelon probably included the three series of sequential intercept lines extending to the Polish national air defense (NAD) corps and the depth of the Pact rear. Meanwhile, Pact fighter- eastern Czechoslovak air defense division, augmented bombers would attempt to cut penetration corridors by the fighters of strategic aviation, the tactical air through NATO's forward air defenses (aided by and air defense forces of any second-echelon fronts extensive attacks by ground forces artillery and mis- located in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and any for- sile forces). They would be followed immediately byward-deployed territorial air defense forces from the other fighter-bombers and light bombers charged with Western Military Districts of the USSR." We esti- locating and destroying on-alert Lance and Pershing mate that nearly two-thirds of the fighter-interceptors SSM and Tomahawk GLCM launchers in the FRG assigned to the Western high command at the outset (and ground forces missiles would attack previously of war probably would be committed to the air located launchers). defense first echelon. Approximately half of the first- echelon fighter-interceptors probably would be as- The so-called air defense operation also would involve signed to the primary axis Soviet-GDR front sector. a large number of attacks against NATO airbases as part of each massed sortie. For the most part these attacks would be smaller and more specialized thanThis distribution of fighters could change during the airbase attacks in the initial air operation. Ac- combat operations because fighters are particularly cording to Soviet employment concepts from the late likely to be relocated to reinforce air def'nse forces in 1970s, part of the front air force ground attack the areas subjected to the heaviest NATO air attacks. aircraft and forward-deployed strategic aviation light Soviet military writers view mobility as the greatest bombers would attempt to temporarily close the run-virtue of fight cr-interceptors and "Sc them in air ways at key NATO airfields (primarily by mining), sodefense plans primarily in areas not covered by as to force the NATO aircraft from those airfields tosurface-to-air missiles. The direction of the initial air recover at alternative bases, where they could not be defense operation by the high command is supposed to protected in hardened shelters. Most of the Pact provide for an optimal distribution of air defense ground attack aircraft, however, would be reserved in forces throughout the TMO-concentrating forces in aerial holding zones near home airfields. These air-the most threatened sectors and preventing unwanted craft subsequently would be directed from airborne gaps in coverage and duplication of effort. alert to attack specific NATO airfields to which returning NATO aircraft had been diverted, in the hope of destroying them in the open. Limited protec- Execution. We have not observed the full details of tive top cover support would be provided by uncom- the execution of a massed sortie of the initial1air mitted fightersLif the medium bombers of the defense operatio We can only assume that they_probably are generally similar to thosd during the late " Overall air defense of the western USSR apparently would be conducted under the direction of the headquarters of the Sovict Air Defense Forces in Moscow, rather than by the Deput Commander in Chief for Air Defcnse Forces in the Western TMO. Top Secret 22
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.