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Warsaw Pact Air Forces: Support of Strategic Operations in Central Europe, CIA/DI/SOVA Intelligence Assessment, January 1985.

Central Intelligence Agency · 95 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.

  • p. 7 …option at the outset of war. -- - The deployment of large numbers of these advanced fighters also…
  • p. 21 …Rigid Soviet employment con- deploying advanced F-15s and additional F-l Is.cepts in the…
  • p. 29 …Participants;The initial air defense operation would to anticipate far enough in advance the approximateinvolve more…
  • p. 36 …o the new Blackjack could be more useful in penetrating NATO's technically advanced air defenses…
  • p. 48 …two hours before the front air forces and the NATO's technically advanced air defense system…
  • p. 49 …case, the Scuds may have been deployed forward to keep pace with the other advancing front…
  • p. 62 …or at NATO reserves advancing toward the drop zones. least until the front main forces have…
  • p. 65 …aircraft in the Western TMO probably would with the advancing ground forces of the coastal front…
  • p. 68 Top Secret - The deployment of large numbers of these advanced Introduce jam-resistant communications that could…
  • p. 70 …army groups and an advance to a particular commands. At the apex of this command pyramid…
  • p. 72 …the defeat of the main forces of specific opposing NATO army corps and an advance to…
  • p. 78 …also includes the Baltic Fleet air forces and the they were researching more advanced ways to…
  • p. 91 …The Soviet term for the branch of the cal-level forces and the provision of substantial…
Figure 7 (continued)
Typical Fighter-Interceptor Distribution a
Regional Sector National Air Defense (NAD) Tactical Fighters Total
Interceptors
First Air Defense Echelon-
Pulish-GDR front ____90 I Ib 200
GSFG-GDR front 190 315 ' 505
Czechoslovak-CGF front 110 __200b 310
Subtotal 390 625 1.015
Second Air Defense Echelon (unreinforced)
orthwesternpPolish_ND s I ll -- 245
Southwestern Polish NAD Corps 110 25 235
Eastern Polish NAD Corps 70 - -
Eastern Czechoslovak NAD Corps 45 0 45
Subtotal 335 260 595-- --- --- --- - -- -- 5
Totul725 __ - - 885 1,610
Possible AIr Defense Reinforcements
Belorussian front 0 135b e 135
Carpathian front -- 0 125 6t 125
Baltic front 0 - ------
Western Military District fighters 0 to 70 0 to 70
Subtotal -0 to 70 370 385 to 560
Total 725 to 795 1,235 1,980 to 2,050
* We assume a three-front force disposition and reinforcement by initially to the SW Polish NAD Corps sector, and the Carpathianthe Vinnitsa SAA. Aircraft strengths have not been reduced to air units have first moved into both that sector and the Easternaccount for likely operational readiness rates or prior attrition. Czechoslovak NAD division sector. Baltic air units would probablyThis number could be augmented by fighter-bombers if necessary. initially rebase to the NW Polish NAD Corps sector.If the fighters of the Legnica SAA use their peacetime basesin r The second air defense echelon of the Western TMO could bewar, they would come under the operational control of the NW reinforced by some of the Soviet fighter units remaining in thePolish NAD Corps when participatir. in air defense operations. Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian MDs. We estimate that asThe fighters of the Vinnitsa SAA arc depicted in the SW Polish many as two of the remaining five fighter regiments probably wouldNAD Corps sector but could be based in the Eastern Czechoslovak be deployed forward into the Western TMO.sector,
d We do not know the intended wartime fighter composition of the
Belorussian, Carpathian, and Baltic frontsbut we_wsimale each is
likely to have three regiments these
units would probably rebase t cc-uurmrg-te- orwar movement of
their fronts. The Belorussian air units have typically rebased
21 . '.S"cret

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.