Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Headquarters”10 pages
Top Secret Table 2 (continued) Assigned Combat-Ready Aircraft Nuclear Alert Available for Combat First Massed Aircraft Rateb Aircraft Rate' Aircraft Sortie (percent) (percen} Baltic FAF Fighter Ito 90 100 100 Attack 60* 90 55 55 Total 4,635 4,140 4,140 Fighter 2,050 1,825 1,825 Attack 1,970 1,765 1,765 Support 615 550 550 Minimum force Legnica SAA - - - Fighter 135 95 130 130 Attack 180 90 and 95 165 30 54 110 Support 40 95 40 40 Baltic-Fleet AF Attack 35 d 85 30 30 GSFG-GDR FAF Fighter 505 85 and 95 460 460 Attack 395 85 and 95 370 30 105 265 Support 100 85 and 95 95 95 Czechoslovak-CGF FAF Fighter 310 85 and 95 270 270 Attack 155 85 130 30 36 95 Support 65 85 and 95 55 55 Second-echelon NAD Fighter 335 _ 85 285 285 Polish-GDR FAF Fighter 200 85 170 170 Attack 65 85 55 55 Total 2,520 2,255 195 2,060 Fighter ' .485 1,315 1,315 Attack 830 750 195 555 Support 205 190 190 Numbers are rounded to the nearest 5 except for nuclear reserves. a We assume forward deployment of Baltic Fleet fighter-bombersWe assume that Soviet fighter, fighter-bomber, and light bomber but insufficient warning for medium bombers to beusedin ourregiments start with a 90-percent operational readiness rate if they moderate force estimate. No forward deployment is assumed in thehad to deploy forward from bases in the USSR, rather than the 95- minimum case. percent Soviet standard for the forward area. Non-Soviet Warsaw e We have assumed that approximately one-third of the fighter-Pact units have an operational readiness rate of 85 percent. bombers assigned to second-echelon fronts located in Poland and'Nuclear reserve percentages are approximate and follow the Czechoslovakia would be used in an air defense role.Soviet norm of being based on authorized unit strengths. We have r We have not redistributed air forces between the five first-echelonfollowed the Soviet practice of specifying the nuclear reserve in fronts, as the Soviets probably would do. Ourterms of flights per regiment or division. In this case we used one figures for the forces of te Belorussian and Carpathian frontsflight per regiment in our moderate farce estimate and three flights simply reflect their point of origin.per regiment in the minimum force. Only units assessedto have aIncludes two Soviet territorial fighter-interceptor regiments de-nuclear roles are counted. ployed forward from the USSR. 19 Top Secret
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.