Warsaw Pact Air Forces: Support of Strategic Operations in Central Europe, CIA/DI/SOVA Intelligence Assessment, January 1985.

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The Soviets' military writings suggest that they prob- aircraft ii a nearly simultaneous air operation wouldably viewed success in the initial air operation largely leave their air defense forces with insufficient num-in terms of winning a contest of attrition-calculating bcrs of fighter-interceptors to break up and inflictin the mid-1970s that they would have to destroy 40 heavy losses on the large NATO air raids.to 50 percent of NATO's combat aircraft to establish
air supremacy. They probably computed this require-
ment on the basis of: By 1977 the Sovicts probably began to perceive that- An estimate that the Warsaw Pact had a starting their clear advantage in the qualitative Central Euro-advantage in the qualitative air balance of probably pean air balance had been turned into a situation ofbetween 1.5:1 and 1.8:1 (see appendix C). near parity, despite their massive modernization with- An assumed cumulative attrition of only about 15 more advanced aircraft, The Soviets' apparent beliefpercent of Pact aircraft for the entire airovcration in an altered air balance probably was derived from
their perception of quantitative and qualitative gains* panning actor requiring that Pact forces achieve by NATO's air forces during the 1970s and 1980s,an advantage in the air balance-measured in terms and it may also have been due in part to changes inof forcewide combat potential-exceeding 2.5:1 by their method of using combat potential scores tothe conclusion of the operation.' calculate the air balance (for further discussion, see
Problems With the Initial Air Operation, By 1974 w ithNATO evidently convinced the Sovies tharation
the General Staff had become concerned that the France would fight with NATO from the outset of ainitial air operation would be highly vulnerable to war with the Warsaw Pact-leading the Soviets=disruption by a preemptive NATO offensive counter- I in 1977 to start counting the approximately
air campaign. The General Staff probably believed 500 combat aircraft in the French air force as part ofthat NATO's awareness of the Soviet concept for the NATO. At about the same time, the United Statesinitial air operation could lead NATO to consider made substantial qualitative and quantitative im-countering it by conducting preemptive attacks provements to its air forces in Central Europe byagainst Pact airbases. Rigid Soviet employment con- deploying advanced F-15s and additional F-l Is.cepts in the mid-1970s evidently provided only for During the late 1970s the NATO nations also com-launching the initial air operation at the outset of a mitted themselves to a major modernization of forcesconventional war-regardless of NATO's course of in the 1980s, based on the Tornado and F-16-action. The Soviets recognized, however, that they aircraft that the Soviets believe to be far superior towould not be able to defeat NATO's air forces with a late-model Soviet aircraft, such as the SU-24 andbrief series of airfield attacks if most of the NATO MIG-23/27. The perception of NATO gains in theaircraft had already taken off before the Pact attack air balance probably caused the Soviet General Staffaircraft arrived at their targets. Moreover, they also to question whether the Pact could muster a sufficientmay have believed that using most of the Pact combat airpower advantage through at least the rest of the
1980s to take the initiative theaterwide at the outsetSoviet military writings from the late 1960s state that an air of war with the high expectation of winnin a contestbalance advantage of better than 2.5:1 constitutes supremacy of
forces. An advantage of only 1.3:1 iscalled unfavorable, with the of attrition for air supremacy.
note that operations begun onthis basis in World War It resulted in
a draw. Ttiny stae further thaltathough it waspermissible 1a Soviet military writings asserted in the late 1970s thatbegin operations with an advantage of between 1.4:1 and 1.7:1, a,
great deal of research demonstrated that, to have sufficient forces an offensive counterair campaign is likely to fail if the
to defeat the enemy air forces, an air balance advantage of at least intended victim maintains a good warning system,.8:1wasnecessary. These writings did not describe how to high air defense forces readiness, and adequate air-calculate the air balance but strongly implied that it should be
based on calculations of combat potential rather than on simple craft cover and dispersal capabilities, in light of these
order of battle. The Soviets useweapon system combat potential
scores as multipliers that they apply to the order of battle to take
account in a simple way of the differences in the perceived combat
utility of various aircraft
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