Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Mission Control”9 pages
Top\Secret Of these missions, the Soviets place greatest emphasis Emergence of the Iritial Air Operation. Air suprcma-on the first major nuclear strike and on attaining cy did not play an important role in Soviet militarystrategic air supremacy, apparently believing that doctrinc during the early 1960s, when Soviet plannersthese are the most critical to the success of their joint were preoccupied with nuclear warfare, but the con-forces operations, as well as more complex. Although cept was recxamined later in the decade in reaction tothe Soviets give first priority to the effective execution NATO's flexible response strategy. In the course ofof their first major nuclear strike, attaining air su- this reexamination, the Soviet Air Forces (SAF) advo-premacy is discussed first in this paper because the cated air supremacy in conventional warfare, citing asSoviets believe that it probably would be important examples of its importance the debilitating effect ononly in a conventional war (thus preceding any nucle- the Red Army of the German seizure of air suprema-ar strikes) and because the Soviet concepts for achiev- cy in the summer of 1941 and the decisive impact ofing air supremacy have undergone greater change in Israel's stunning victory over the Egyptian Air Forcerecent years. at the start of the 1967 Middle East war Attaining Air Supremacy By 1970 the Soviet Air Forces apparently had per- suaded the General Staff of the need for air suprema-Strategic air supremacy-according to Soviet detni-. cy in a conventional war in Central Europe and that ittion-is when the air forces have decisive superiority could be won only through a massive preemptive airover enemy air forces, hold the initiative in the air, offensive against NATO airbases. Perhaps equallyand are capable of imposing their will on the enemy important, this initial air operation' also was promot-throughout the TMO. Having air supremacy would ed as the only viable way to destroy a large portion ofpernit Pact ground, naval, and air forces to perform NATO's nuclear forces before their inevitable use.their tasks without significant opposition from enemy The Soviet Air Forces focused extensive efforts duringair and air defense forces. Attaining air supremacy is the early 1970s on refining force employment con-the only joint forces strategic objective for which the cepts for a brief but intense initial air operationPact air forces would play the primary role. Senior designed to achieve a quick and relatively inexpensiveSoviet military leaders have recently stressed the victory in the air war and on acquiring aircraft thatconcept's criticality, indicating that it would be one of were better suited for conventional operationsthe two most important objectives for the Warsaw Pact joint forces at the outset of a conventional war in the Western TMO (the other would be the destruction By 1975 the initial air operation had been incorporat-of NATO's nuclear forces and the prevention of a ed into Pact war plans, but it featured larger forcespreemptive NATO nuclear strike). than the original SAF proposals because the Czecho- slovak and Polish air forces were given a role andConcept Development because Soviet front aviation forces had increased inIn writings the Soviet General Staff expressed in- size by about 10 percent. At the same time, the plan- creasing concern during the 1970s about the difficulty for the initial air operation was simplified by reducingand high cost of winning air supremacy in Central from three to two the number of attacking waves (so-Europe. Nonetheless, the General Staff has remained called echelons) of aircraft in each of the three massedfirmly committed to that ambitious objective, belicv- air raids of the air operation ing that without it the Pact conventional ground campaign could fail. Accordingly, since the late 'We use the term "initial air operation" to distinguish the airI 970s, the Soviets bhave instituted major changes in operation for air supremacy that would beconducted early in a war their force employment concepts, their force struc- with NATO from the other types of offensive air operations thatther orc eplometcncpts teirfoce trc- could befondusied by strategic avi ation later toachieve variousture, and their command and control system in the objective. hope of improving their prospects for success in what they call the "struggle for air supremacy." Top-Secret
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.