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Warsaw Pact Air Forces: Support of Strategic Operations in Central Europe, CIA/DI/SOVA Intelligence Assessment, January 1985.

Central Intelligence Agency · 95 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.

  • p. 6 'op\Secret %writingsindicate that the newly created wartime theater high command headquarters was designated as the…
  • p. 10 …appendix D wartime of high command headquarters in the most important TMOs as extensions of the…
  • p. 23 …of the initial aircommand, front, and army headquarters, to allow operation also emphasizes the need to…
  • p. 31 …be conducted under the direction of the headquarters of the Sovict Air Defense Forces in Moscow…
  • p. 35 …increasingly difficult a large number of cooperating headquarters. It would problem for the Pact air defense…
  • p. 49 …day during a rapidly presumably high command headquarters would plan moving Pact offensive. Thus, for example…
  • p. 90 …protection for aviation formations and army aviation headquarters airborne and amphibious operations and for strike elements…
  • p. 91 …Front air forces headquarters and corps-size groupings of tactical-level forces. Oper- would coordinate and…
  • p. 93 …Tactical forces ducted for the General Staff and the TMO high have headquarters staffs of limited…
  • p. 94 …Intelligence collection per- formed for ground army and division headquarters, primarily to support the planning and…
Top Secret
Figure 1 (continued) Pr
Land Theaters of Military Operations Ground Forces Air Forces -Strategic Roct
-- - Forces
Ready Weapons Combat Veatpns Strikes r
- - Divisions b Scnres d Aircraft * Scores d
Northwestern 4 3 4 4
-W estern a 64- - -- - - - ... - . --- - -s tw 65 68 66 .
31 29 30 21
* Includes only front air forces, because the intended distribution of targets, preliminary SOVA analysis o the distribution of likelystrategic aviation sorties is not clear-although weestimate it c. tret SRF taryets in Europe suggests that any such changes arewould be similar to the rertonal distribution of front air for.es probably small (no Eorethan a 5- to 10ercent diTererce in theb Includes only redy divisions (uivisions assessedto be manned in Western TMO allocation).
peacetime as between 50 and 100 percent of their authorized aIncludes only the forces of the Leningrad Military District.wartime strengt)o i Includes the forces of th, Group of Soviet Forces Germany.a Includes all weapons in all units. Central Group of Forces, Northern Grottp of Forces. Baltic MD,These are percentages of acgregated weapons effectiveness scores, Belorussian MD, Carpathian MD, Fast Germany, Czechoslovakia,bated on Soviet pcrccltions of combat potential, and Poland. Forces from the Kiev MID could also be used but arc" Includes blghterinterceptors, fued-wing ground attack aircraft, counted in te Southwestern TMIO in these calculatios.
and attack hlicocs. Includes the forces of the Southern Group of Forces, Odessa MD,
Transcaucasus MD, Kiev MD, North Caucasus MD, Ilungary,
hilT~hT-laiid-iibT5Thatn ~Bulgaria,and Romania.
targets may have changed since 1965 as the result of MR/IRBM
force modernization and the evolution of the intended NATO
Strategic Rocket Farces (SR F), and the Catirc armed units. (The typical composition of air forces in the-forces of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland would Western TMO is depicted inbe committed to this single TMO. We estimate that figure 2 and in to e
the Soviet General StafT (acting as the executive agent
of the Supreme High Command) would assign to the Front Air Forces. Sovict exercises and military writ-Western TMO about two-thirds of the ground and air ings typically portray the first strategic offensiveforces and perhaps three-fourths of the SRF strikes operation being initiated by at least three first-echelonallocated for use in the European theater of war (see fronts, although the number may vary depending onfigure 1). the reinforcement scenario. Each of the several fronts
designated to participate in the TMO strategic opera-Air Forces Participatior, tion would have a subordinate air force of fighters,The participation of Pact air forces in those combat ground attack aircraft, and reconnaissance aircraft.activities considered especially important in accom- The front air forces would also include the front- andplshing the strategic operation's major objectives and army-level army aviation forces-consisting primarilythose that required substantial use of Soviet strategic of helicopters. The composition of the individualreserve air forces would be planned and directed by front's air forces would v;,y through reassignment ofthe TMO Deputy Commander in Chief for Air Forces aircraft among them by the Western high command.and his air stalT. The Deputy CinC for Air Forces
would have at his disposal elements of two to four
strategic air armies; three to seven front air forces;
and various air defense, transport, and naval aviation
3 T4 Secret

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.