Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

intend to retain them in operational status throughout 180. Long-Range Bombers. The Soviets could
the period of this Estimate. strike peripheral targets with their Bear and Bison
178. Backfire. Late in 1974 the Soviets began bombers even though they are intended primarily for
deployment of the Backfire to both Long Range intercontinental operations. Use of these aircraft
(lepoymntf th Bakfie t bot Log Rnge would enable the Soviets to attack distant targets,
Aviation and Soviet Naval Aviation units in the west- woulrenal te ores t a. din targes,
ern USSR. This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises,
radius and payload capacity that exceeds existing LRA Bears have simulated such antiship strikes. About
Soviet intermediate-range bombers. It is well suited 70 of the 105 Bears assigned to LRA are armed with
for strikes against strategic targets on the periphery of air-to-surface missiles and most of the remainder with
the USSR. It has swingwings which enable it to cruise free-fall bombs. Of the 82 Bisons in LRA, about 30 are
at supersonic speeds a higher altitudes and at high equipped as tanker aircraft, while the rest are free-fall
subsonic speeds at low altitudes. It is equipped with bombers. We also have evidence that a development
ECM equipment to facilitate penetration of modern program is under way to equip Bears to carry bombs
air defenses. On a high-speed, low-level penetration or two AS-4s or AS-6s instead of a single AS-3.
mission, the Backfire would be able to take off from a 181. Ballistic Missile Submarines. The peripheral
base in the interior of the USSR with the flexibility to strike forces of the Soviet Navy consist of 22 G- and
strike a greater number of more distant targets in H-class ballistic missile submarines, of which 11 are
Europe, Asia, and Africa than either the Badger or probably targeted against NATO. (See figure 1I-31.)
Blinder. The Backfire can carry either conventional or The C- and F-class submarines initially served as part
nuclear bombs or AS-4 ASMs. There are about 45 of the Soviet intercontinental attack force, but by the
Backfires operational within LRA in the western mid-1970s the availability of newer, more modern
USSR, and another 40 are operational in SNA. Back- submarines allowed the Soviets to begin relieving these
fires are being produced at a rate of between two and older units of their intercontinental mission. Recent
three per month. patrol patterns suggest that almost all operational G-
and H-class ballistic missile submarines have shifted to
179. According to one view in the Intelligence peripheral attack missions.
Community, the performance characteristics, deploy-
ment patterns, training programs, and exercise partici- 182. In 1976, the Soviets transferred six G-II class
pation of the Backfire, as well as Soviet statements submarines from the Northern Fleet to the Liepaja
concerning it, point to peripheral strike as its primary Naval Base on the Baltic Sea-the first deployment of
mission.25 According to another view, the Backfire is a ballistic missile submarines to that operating area.
long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted with their
targets on unrefueled range and radius missions. The 800-nm SS-N-5 missiles could cover targets in West.
holders of this view agree that the aircraft will have Germany, the Benelux countries, and Scandinavia
significant peripheral missions, but they would note without leaving local waters. By moving to the area off
that the Soviets have the option to use the Backfire's the coast of Poland, they could extend missile coverage
intercontinental capabilities at their own initiative. to include much of the United Kingdom, France, and
Thus, in their view, the Backfire poses a significant Italy. Operations in the Baltic would be more secure
threat to the contiguous United States as well as to than in the Norwegian Sea, inasmuch as NATO
areas on the Soviet periphery.26 (For differing views of countries have only a few ASW forces in the Baltic,
the Backfire's unrefueled combat radius and of the and Soviet naval and air forces could offer protection
areas it could strike on unrefueled- radius missions for the submarines. There are four H-class SSBNs
from current deployment bases, see figure I1-30.) based in the Soviet Northern Fleet. It would take these
units four days to deploy to a position where their
The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency; SS-N-5 missiles would be within range of West Euro-
the Director,Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of pean targets. For this purpose, however, they would
State; the Director, National Security Agency; and the Director of have to transit around Norway and would be vulner-Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. able to detection by Western ASW forces.
" The holders of this view are the Director,Defense Intelligence
Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department 183. The G- and IH-class submarines add a degreeof the Army; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force. The performance of the Backfire is of flexibility to the strategic forces for peripheral strike
addressed at greater length in NIE 11-3/8-78, Soviet Capabilities and their mobility makes them considerably less vul-
for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the Late 1980s. nerable than the fixed, land-based missile systems.
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