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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
intend to retain them in operational status throughout 180. Long-Range Bombers. The Soviets could
the period of this Estimate. strike peripheral targets with their Bear and Bison
178. Backfire. Late in 1974 the Soviets began bombers even though they are intended primarily for
deployment of the Backfire to both Long Range intercontinental operations. Use of these aircraft
(lepoymntf th Bakfie t bot Log Rnge would enable the Soviets to attack distant targets,
Aviation and Soviet Naval Aviation units in the west- woulrenal te ores t a. din targes,
ern USSR. This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises,
radius and payload capacity that exceeds existing LRA Bears have simulated such antiship strikes. About
Soviet intermediate-range bombers. It is well suited 70 of the 105 Bears assigned to LRA are armed with
for strikes against strategic targets on the periphery of air-to-surface missiles and most of the remainder with
the USSR. It has swingwings which enable it to cruise free-fall bombs. Of the 82 Bisons in LRA, about 30 are
at supersonic speeds a higher altitudes and at high equipped as tanker aircraft, while the rest are free-fall
subsonic speeds at low altitudes. It is equipped with bombers. We also have evidence that a development
ECM equipment to facilitate penetration of modern program is under way to equip Bears to carry bombs
air defenses. On a high-speed, low-level penetration or two AS-4s or AS-6s instead of a single AS-3.
mission, the Backfire would be able to take off from a 181. Ballistic Missile Submarines. The peripheral
base in the interior of the USSR with the flexibility to strike forces of the Soviet Navy consist of 22 G- and
strike a greater number of more distant targets in H-class ballistic missile submarines, of which 11 are
Europe, Asia, and Africa than either the Badger or probably targeted against NATO. (See figure 1I-31.)
Blinder. The Backfire can carry either conventional or The C- and F-class submarines initially served as part
nuclear bombs or AS-4 ASMs. There are about 45 of the Soviet intercontinental attack force, but by the
Backfires operational within LRA in the western mid-1970s the availability of newer, more modern
USSR, and another 40 are operational in SNA. Back- submarines allowed the Soviets to begin relieving these
fires are being produced at a rate of between two and older units of their intercontinental mission. Recent
three per month. patrol patterns suggest that almost all operational G-
and H-class ballistic missile submarines have shifted to
179. According to one view in the Intelligence peripheral attack missions.
Community, the performance characteristics, deploy-
ment patterns, training programs, and exercise partici- 182. In 1976, the Soviets transferred six G-II class
pation of the Backfire, as well as Soviet statements submarines from the Northern Fleet to the Liepaja
concerning it, point to peripheral strike as its primary Naval Base on the Baltic Sea-the first deployment of
mission.25 According to another view, the Backfire is a ballistic missile submarines to that operating area.
long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted with their
targets on unrefueled range and radius missions. The 800-nm SS-N-5 missiles could cover targets in West.
holders of this view agree that the aircraft will have Germany, the Benelux countries, and Scandinavia
significant peripheral missions, but they would note without leaving local waters. By moving to the area off
that the Soviets have the option to use the Backfire's the coast of Poland, they could extend missile coverage
intercontinental capabilities at their own initiative. to include much of the United Kingdom, France, and
Thus, in their view, the Backfire poses a significant Italy. Operations in the Baltic would be more secure
threat to the contiguous United States as well as to than in the Norwegian Sea, inasmuch as NATO
areas on the Soviet periphery.26 (For differing views of countries have only a few ASW forces in the Baltic,
the Backfire's unrefueled combat radius and of the and Soviet naval and air forces could offer protection
areas it could strike on unrefueled- radius missions for the submarines. There are four H-class SSBNs
from current deployment bases, see figure I1-30.) based in the Soviet Northern Fleet. It would take these
units four days to deploy to a position where their
The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency; SS-N-5 missiles would be within range of West Euro-
the Director,Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of pean targets. For this purpose, however, they would
State; the Director, National Security Agency; and the Director of have to transit around Norway and would be vulner-Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. able to detection by Western ASW forces.
" The holders of this view are the Director,Defense Intelligence
Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department 183. The G- and IH-class submarines add a degreeof the Army; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force. The performance of the Backfire is of flexibility to the strategic forces for peripheral strike
addressed at greater length in NIE 11-3/8-78, Soviet Capabilities and their mobility makes them considerably less vul-
for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the Late 1980s. nerable than the fixed, land-based missile systems.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.