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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
Table II-12 necessary. In the late 1960s, they built 120 SS-11
launchers which were oriented so as to provide better
Soviet Strategic Attack Forces Intended coverage of West European and Middle Eastern tar-
Chiefly for Use Against NATO gets. Although these missiles have since been replaced
January 1979 with newer systems, the Soviets may continue to
Land-Based Missiles (Launchers) allocate some of the ICBM force to peripheral targets.
SS-4 MRBM 384 All the USSR's new ICBMs have the capability to be
SS-5 IRBM 61 launched in nearly any direction and probably can be
SS-20 IRBM 45-63 retargeted rapidly. In addition, all but the SS-18 ICBM
Total 490-508 have been tested at reduced ranges.
Long Range Aviation Bombers
TU-16 Badger 325 176. Intermediate-Range Bombers. The LRA in-
ackf rlinder i5 termediate-range bombers can perform a variety of
Total 525 missions in peripheral areas, including delivery of
-a5 conventional and nuclear weapons, reconnaissance,
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles and electronic warfare. These aircraft provide the
-(ISumarines/Launchers)1/3 Soviets with a mission flexibility that is not available
G-11 SSB . 6/18 . with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA
H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate-range bomber force based opposite
Total _ 11/33 NATO now consists of about 155 Blinders and 325
*Range reflects uncertainty about the operational status of two Badgers. This represents about 75 percent of the total.
SS-20 bases. Soviet intermediate-range bomber force. About 65 of
T-Srerm. the Blinders carry the AS-4 air-to-surface missile and
do not have a bombing capability. About 15 of the
173. The latest land-based ballistic missile to be remaining 90 Blinders are specially configured for
deployed for theater use is. the SS-20 IRBM system. reconnaissance and have no capability for weapons
This system is mobile, a characterisitic that signifi- delivery, and another 15 are used as trainers. About
cantly reduces its vulnerability. It carries three 170 Badgers opposite NATO are equipped with AS-5-
multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles or AS-6 missiles but can also be used as free-fall
(MIRVs), a payload that allows more targets to be bombers. (See figure II-29.) The rest of the Badgers
attacked with fewer missiles. It uses solid propellants opposite NATO, with the exception of about 10 that
and has better accuracy, reaction time, and refire are configured as tankers, have only a free-fall bomb-
capabilities than the SS-4 and SS-5. The better surviv- ing capability or are configured for electronic support
ability and refire capability of the SS-20 system as or reconnaissance missions.
compared with the SS-4 and SS-5 will significantly
increase the firepower and flexibility of the Soviet 177. Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have been
peripheral strike forces. The reduced vulnerability of working to improve the capabilities of the air-to-
the SS-20 missiles could also lessen the Soviet incentive surface missiles carried by their bombers. In 1970 they
to launch them preemptively to prevent their destruc- deployed the AS-6, a missile superior to the older AS-5
tion by a NATO first strike., in both range and speed. All Badger units have since
174. We expect that eventually the SS-20 will re- been equipped with the AS-6, although some AS-5s
place the SS-4s and SS-5s and that, by the early 1980s, remain in service. The Soviets have also developed a
it will be the mainstay of the land-based ballisti' guidance system that permits their AS-4, AS-5, and
isill fore the maihay ofuhe laAS-6 missiles to home on radar signals and thus
suppress enemy air defenses. The Badger, which ac-
counts for about two-thirds of the force, entered
service some 25 years ago and has not been produced
since 1959. The Blinder, a design of the late 1950s,
began to enter the force in 1962 and went out of
production in 1969. Nevertheless, the Soviets are
175. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. The So- seeking to extend the useful life of those aircraft by
victs have about 1,400 ICBM launchers, some of which equipping them with improved missiles and convert-
could be brought to bear against peripheral targets if ing some to conduct electronic warfare. They clearly
11-52
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.