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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
Table II-12 necessary. In the late 1960s, they built 120 SS-11
launchers which were oriented so as to provide better
Soviet Strategic Attack Forces Intended coverage of West European and Middle Eastern tar-
Chiefly for Use Against NATO gets. Although these missiles have since been replaced
January 1979 with newer systems, the Soviets may continue to
Land-Based Missiles (Launchers) allocate some of the ICBM force to peripheral targets.
SS-4 MRBM 384 All the USSR's new ICBMs have the capability to be
SS-5 IRBM 61 launched in nearly any direction and probably can be
SS-20 IRBM 45-63 retargeted rapidly. In addition, all but the SS-18 ICBM
Total 490-508 have been tested at reduced ranges.
Long Range Aviation Bombers
TU-16 Badger 325 176. Intermediate-Range Bombers. The LRA in-
ackf rlinder i5 termediate-range bombers can perform a variety of
Total 525 missions in peripheral areas, including delivery of
-a5 conventional and nuclear weapons, reconnaissance,
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles and electronic warfare. These aircraft provide the
-(ISumarines/Launchers)1/3 Soviets with a mission flexibility that is not available
G-11 SSB . 6/18 . with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA
H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate-range bomber force based opposite
Total _ 11/33 NATO now consists of about 155 Blinders and 325
*Range reflects uncertainty about the operational status of two Badgers. This represents about 75 percent of the total.
SS-20 bases. Soviet intermediate-range bomber force. About 65 of
T-Srerm. the Blinders carry the AS-4 air-to-surface missile and
do not have a bombing capability. About 15 of the
173. The latest land-based ballistic missile to be remaining 90 Blinders are specially configured for
deployed for theater use is. the SS-20 IRBM system. reconnaissance and have no capability for weapons
This system is mobile, a characterisitic that signifi- delivery, and another 15 are used as trainers. About
cantly reduces its vulnerability. It carries three 170 Badgers opposite NATO are equipped with AS-5-
multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles or AS-6 missiles but can also be used as free-fall
(MIRVs), a payload that allows more targets to be bombers. (See figure II-29.) The rest of the Badgers
attacked with fewer missiles. It uses solid propellants opposite NATO, with the exception of about 10 that
and has better accuracy, reaction time, and refire are configured as tankers, have only a free-fall bomb-
capabilities than the SS-4 and SS-5. The better surviv- ing capability or are configured for electronic support
ability and refire capability of the SS-20 system as or reconnaissance missions.
compared with the SS-4 and SS-5 will significantly
increase the firepower and flexibility of the Soviet 177. Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have been
peripheral strike forces. The reduced vulnerability of working to improve the capabilities of the air-to-
the SS-20 missiles could also lessen the Soviet incentive surface missiles carried by their bombers. In 1970 they
to launch them preemptively to prevent their destruc- deployed the AS-6, a missile superior to the older AS-5
tion by a NATO first strike., in both range and speed. All Badger units have since
174. We expect that eventually the SS-20 will re- been equipped with the AS-6, although some AS-5s
place the SS-4s and SS-5s and that, by the early 1980s, remain in service. The Soviets have also developed a
it will be the mainstay of the land-based ballisti' guidance system that permits their AS-4, AS-5, and
isill fore the maihay ofuhe laAS-6 missiles to home on radar signals and thus
suppress enemy air defenses. The Badger, which ac-
counts for about two-thirds of the force, entered
service some 25 years ago and has not been produced
since 1959. The Blinder, a design of the late 1950s,
began to enter the force in 1962 and went out of
production in 1969. Nevertheless, the Soviets are
175. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. The So- seeking to extend the useful life of those aircraft by
victs have about 1,400 ICBM launchers, some of which equipping them with improved missiles and convert-
could be brought to bear against peripheral targets if ing some to conduct electronic warfare. They clearly
11-52
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.