“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 8 …I1-41
Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of
Communication 11-41…
- p. 9 …IV-25
Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27
Initial Air and Naval Operations…
- p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1
,'-
-
"''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea
Warsaw…
- p. 20 …An area in the
Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
10
- p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black
Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
- p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the
amphibious force…
- p. 23 …The Soviets would
attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the
Norwegian Sea…
- p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction
Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
- p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air
Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
- p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before
Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
- p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of
36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
- p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing
division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
- p. 54 …7
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP
NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle
Norwegian divisionCategory I
Sea Category II
Category…
- p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
- p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea,
January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
- p. 72 …PO A
; re
-t {
- Black Sea Fleet
ROMANI A
-UGM (Dsevastopo -
BUGRAFleet Caspian
headquarters Black Sea…
- p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert
deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
- p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
- p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's
general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
- p. 77 lop et
Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a
Maximum system
Payload (kg) Speed…
- p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b
Altitude (m)
18…
- p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date
remain submerged for…
- p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
- p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas.
IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F
bottom…
- p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea
Lines of Communication
142. In wartime, the Soviets…
- p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO
Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
- p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North
Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
- p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted
strength of…
- p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA
H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
- p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises,
radius…
- p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500)
Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
- p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor-
ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
- p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for
probably…
- p. 113 …The Soviets
to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however,
and instead…
- p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize
example, emergency action drills at sea are…
- p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to
foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
- p. 118 …Pact operations in the western
and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
- p. 121 …Barents Sea
Maritime /
T VD 49 shr rri s /
Norwegian
ICELAND '1 I '
Sea T''f…
- p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would
be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
- p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7
~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea
North Sea -?
- ASNDT1 4... .
NETHERLANDS
1…
- p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would
choose to attack with the two-front…
- p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea-
HAWK missile belt -
Penetration corridor - -
North Sea
i/
POLAND
- West Berlin…
- p. 144 …This
buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
- p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
- p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its
infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
- p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be
recognize that the…
- p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would
operations, and the speed with…
- p. 149 …southwestern
Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces
Soviet divisions in Hungary…
- p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into
IV-26
- p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea
would be particularly critical to the Pact…
- p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of
bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
- p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern
advantages…
- p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to
before the outbreak of hostilities…
- p. 155 -T _P.3_re4'
few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
- p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect
103 and table…
- p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian-
reinforce airborne and…
- p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise
Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
- p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
- p. 160 …1 Sea control
N eMurmansk
_ G+UK "r'
Gap ''-1
(5Sea denial, ?"
Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
- p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our
began, however, these forces probably would…
Table II-12 necessary. In the late 1960s, they built 120 SS-11
launchers which were oriented so as to provide better
Soviet Strategic Attack Forces Intended coverage of West European and Middle Eastern tar-
Chiefly for Use Against NATO gets. Although these missiles have since been replaced
January 1979 with newer systems, the Soviets may continue to
Land-Based Missiles (Launchers) allocate some of the ICBM force to peripheral targets.
SS-4 MRBM 384 All the USSR's new ICBMs have the capability to be
SS-5 IRBM 61 launched in nearly any direction and probably can be
SS-20 IRBM 45-63 retargeted rapidly. In addition, all but the SS-18 ICBM
Total 490-508 have been tested at reduced ranges.
Long Range Aviation Bombers
TU-16 Badger 325 176. Intermediate-Range Bombers. The LRA in-
ackf rlinder i5 termediate-range bombers can perform a variety of
Total 525 missions in peripheral areas, including delivery of
-a5 conventional and nuclear weapons, reconnaissance,
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles and electronic warfare. These aircraft provide the
-(ISumarines/Launchers)1/3 Soviets with a mission flexibility that is not available
G-11 SSB . 6/18 . with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA
H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate-range bomber force based opposite
Total _ 11/33 NATO now consists of about 155 Blinders and 325
*Range reflects uncertainty about the operational status of two Badgers. This represents about 75 percent of the total.
SS-20 bases. Soviet intermediate-range bomber force. About 65 of
T-Srerm. the Blinders carry the AS-4 air-to-surface missile and
do not have a bombing capability. About 15 of the
173. The latest land-based ballistic missile to be remaining 90 Blinders are specially configured for
deployed for theater use is. the SS-20 IRBM system. reconnaissance and have no capability for weapons
This system is mobile, a characterisitic that signifi- delivery, and another 15 are used as trainers. About
cantly reduces its vulnerability. It carries three 170 Badgers opposite NATO are equipped with AS-5-
multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles or AS-6 missiles but can also be used as free-fall
(MIRVs), a payload that allows more targets to be bombers. (See figure II-29.) The rest of the Badgers
attacked with fewer missiles. It uses solid propellants opposite NATO, with the exception of about 10 that
and has better accuracy, reaction time, and refire are configured as tankers, have only a free-fall bomb-
capabilities than the SS-4 and SS-5. The better surviv- ing capability or are configured for electronic support
ability and refire capability of the SS-20 system as or reconnaissance missions.
compared with the SS-4 and SS-5 will significantly
increase the firepower and flexibility of the Soviet 177. Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have been
peripheral strike forces. The reduced vulnerability of working to improve the capabilities of the air-to-
the SS-20 missiles could also lessen the Soviet incentive surface missiles carried by their bombers. In 1970 they
to launch them preemptively to prevent their destruc- deployed the AS-6, a missile superior to the older AS-5
tion by a NATO first strike., in both range and speed. All Badger units have since
174. We expect that eventually the SS-20 will re- been equipped with the AS-6, although some AS-5s
place the SS-4s and SS-5s and that, by the early 1980s, remain in service. The Soviets have also developed a
it will be the mainstay of the land-based ballisti' guidance system that permits their AS-4, AS-5, and
isill fore the maihay ofuhe laAS-6 missiles to home on radar signals and thus
suppress enemy air defenses. The Badger, which ac-
counts for about two-thirds of the force, entered
service some 25 years ago and has not been produced
since 1959. The Blinder, a design of the late 1950s,
began to enter the force in 1962 and went out of
production in 1969. Nevertheless, the Soviets are
175. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. The So- seeking to extend the useful life of those aircraft by
victs have about 1,400 ICBM launchers, some of which equipping them with improved missiles and convert-
could be brought to bear against peripheral targets if ing some to conduct electronic warfare. They clearly
11-52
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