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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 114 …recently halted Soviet air operations from Conakry. These developments will obviously force the 257. Many officers…
  • p. 115 …order to keep other in establishing effective air cover over supporting lines units operational. of communication…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets could elect to provide combat forces scale commitment of manpower and materiel which to…
  • p. 187 …This force is occasionally aug- forces could not be safely transported by sea or air to…
  • p. 188 …a war, but they couldsome naval and air force weapons (including a few recently introduced Flogger…
Table II-12 necessary. In the late 1960s, they built 120 SS-11
launchers which were oriented so as to provide better
Soviet Strategic Attack Forces Intended coverage of West European and Middle Eastern tar-
Chiefly for Use Against NATO gets. Although these missiles have since been replaced
January 1979 with newer systems, the Soviets may continue to
Land-Based Missiles (Launchers) allocate some of the ICBM force to peripheral targets.
SS-4 MRBM 384 All the USSR's new ICBMs have the capability to be
SS-5 IRBM 61 launched in nearly any direction and probably can be
SS-20 IRBM 45-63 retargeted rapidly. In addition, all but the SS-18 ICBM
Total 490-508 have been tested at reduced ranges.
Long Range Aviation Bombers
TU-16 Badger 325 176. Intermediate-Range Bombers. The LRA in-
ackf rlinder i5 termediate-range bombers can perform a variety of
Total 525 missions in peripheral areas, including delivery of
-a5 conventional and nuclear weapons, reconnaissance,
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles and electronic warfare. These aircraft provide the
-(ISumarines/Launchers)1/3 Soviets with a mission flexibility that is not available
G-11 SSB . 6/18 . with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA
H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate-range bomber force based opposite
Total _ 11/33 NATO now consists of about 155 Blinders and 325
*Range reflects uncertainty about the operational status of two Badgers. This represents about 75 percent of the total.
SS-20 bases. Soviet intermediate-range bomber force. About 65 of
T-Srerm. the Blinders carry the AS-4 air-to-surface missile and
do not have a bombing capability. About 15 of the
173. The latest land-based ballistic missile to be remaining 90 Blinders are specially configured for
deployed for theater use is. the SS-20 IRBM system. reconnaissance and have no capability for weapons
This system is mobile, a characterisitic that signifi- delivery, and another 15 are used as trainers. About
cantly reduces its vulnerability. It carries three 170 Badgers opposite NATO are equipped with AS-5-
multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles or AS-6 missiles but can also be used as free-fall
(MIRVs), a payload that allows more targets to be bombers. (See figure II-29.) The rest of the Badgers
attacked with fewer missiles. It uses solid propellants opposite NATO, with the exception of about 10 that
and has better accuracy, reaction time, and refire are configured as tankers, have only a free-fall bomb-
capabilities than the SS-4 and SS-5. The better surviv- ing capability or are configured for electronic support
ability and refire capability of the SS-20 system as or reconnaissance missions.
compared with the SS-4 and SS-5 will significantly
increase the firepower and flexibility of the Soviet 177. Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have been
peripheral strike forces. The reduced vulnerability of working to improve the capabilities of the air-to-
the SS-20 missiles could also lessen the Soviet incentive surface missiles carried by their bombers. In 1970 they
to launch them preemptively to prevent their destruc- deployed the AS-6, a missile superior to the older AS-5
tion by a NATO first strike., in both range and speed. All Badger units have since
174. We expect that eventually the SS-20 will re- been equipped with the AS-6, although some AS-5s
place the SS-4s and SS-5s and that, by the early 1980s, remain in service. The Soviets have also developed a
it will be the mainstay of the land-based ballisti' guidance system that permits their AS-4, AS-5, and
isill fore the maihay ofuhe laAS-6 missiles to home on radar signals and thus
suppress enemy air defenses. The Badger, which ac-
counts for about two-thirds of the force, entered
service some 25 years ago and has not been produced
since 1959. The Blinder, a design of the late 1950s,
began to enter the force in 1962 and went out of
production in 1969. Nevertheless, the Soviets are
175. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. The So- seeking to extend the useful life of those aircraft by
victs have about 1,400 ICBM launchers, some of which equipping them with improved missiles and convert-
could be brought to bear against peripheral targets if ing some to conduct electronic warfare. They clearly
11-52
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.