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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
as 1969 or 1970. missile. The Backfire is well suited for the peripheral
strike mission and greatly improves the payload and
penetration capabilities of Soviet bomber forces tar-
geted against NATO. The mobile SS-20 force, when
fully deployed, will have greater survivability and
destructive power than the present peripheral missile
169. Missile warhead storage capacity in Central force.
Europe appears adequate, provided the higher esti-
mates of capacity are correct, but bomb storage 171. Elements of all the Soviet strategic attack
capacity appears to be insufficient to satisfy the forces-the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), Long
reuirements for tactical nuclear operations Range Aviation (LRA), and the Soviet Navy-have the
mission of carrying out nuclear strikes against NATO
Soviets are estimated to have storage capacity or only targets. (See table II-12.) These include medium- and
200 to 605 bombs in East Germany, 70 to 185 in intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SS-4 MRBMs,
Poland, and 30 to 95 in Czechoslovakia. They prob- SS-5 and SS-20 IRBMs), LRA bombers (Badger,
ably plan to move additional bombs and warheads into Blinder, Backfire), and ballistic missile submarines
the forward area from the numerous tactical nuclear (G-class and IH-class). Only a relatively small portion
weapons storage sites in the western USSR before or of the USSR's ICBMs and modern ballistic missile
during hostilities. submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets
in NATO Europe, and the 150 strike-configured Bear
and Bison bombers in LRA are intended mainly for
intercontinental missions.
172. Medium- and Intermediate-Range Ballistic
Missiles. The major portion of the land-based ballistic
missile force that would be employed for peripheral
Soviet Peripheral Strike Forces " attack consists of 416 SS-4 MRBM and 80 SS-5 IRBM
launchers located at 54 complexes in the European
170. For strategic forces the most significant devel- and south-central USSR. (See figure II-28.) This force
opments have been the deployment of the Backfire includes 11.8 silo launchers and 378 aboveground
bomber and the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic launchers with fixed launch pads, a mode of deploy-
ment which makes them vulnerable to attack. Of these
E This section summarizes the current status of Soviet peripheral launchers, 445 are believed to be aimed against NATOstrategic forces intended for use against NATO. A more detailed
description of the deployment patterns and technical characterisitics and other targets on the western periphery of the
of these systems is contained in NIE 11-6-78, Soviet Strategic Forces USSR. The remaining 51 launchers probably are for
for PeripheralAttack, use against targets in Asia and the Middle East.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.