Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“The Advance”37 pages
i ~ToP similar to the Scaleboard missile in range capability clear capabilities to be prepared for the more serious but probably has improved accuracy and warheads. nuclear war contingency. 165. Soviet Nuclear Weapons Storage Sites in 161. Nuclear Artillery. The Soviets have 250 to 300 Eastern Europe. There are 23 Soviet storage sites in nuclear-capable artillery pieces in their forces in the Eastern Europe, at least some of which almost certain- western USSR. Nuclear-capable 203-mm self-proEleven of them are pelled guns and 240-mm self-propelled mortars have located at Soviet tactical airfields, and 12 are isolated been identified in two heavy artillery units there. Five installations for the storage of warheads for tactical other heavy artillery units there are equipped with isileand rthe figre II-27.) obsolete 203-mm and 240-mm weapons. No Soviet missiles and rockets. (See figure 11-27.) heavy artillery units have been identified outside the USSR. it is also believed-ulilely that these installations, with their extensive security, high-quality support facilities, and in most instances apparently continuous occupation by . Soviet troops, would be maintained simply as future l'here is n o reliable evi staging points for warheads moved from the USSR in dence that the Soviets have nuclear rounds for their time of tension or after a conflict began. We do not 152-mm artillery pieces-the largest now in the forces believe that the NSWP countries operate or control in Central Europe. any of the nuclear storage sites in Eastern Europe. 162. Soviet nuclear artillery developments suggest 166. that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the problems of providing close-in nuclear support to Pact ground forces. Soviet writings have long acknowledged that, because NATO's nuclear-capable artillery would be deployed close to the battleline, Pact artillery fire would be the most effective and responsive means for destroying it. 163. Naval Forces. All fleets in the Soviet Navy are also equipped with nuclear-capable weapon systems There is no firm evidence regarding the mix of for use in theater warfare. Virtually all of the USSR's weapons stored in these bunkers, the portion of the operational submarines carry nuclear interior space used for storage, or that reserved for torpedoes, and at least half of the missiles on board -arhead_assembh, maintenance and checkout. Soviet cruise-missile submarines are equipped with nuclear warheads. This loading reflects the Soviet belief that, although war could begin conventionally in Europe, it would be fought under constant threat of 167. Depending on the type stored and storage escalation to the use of nuclear weapons. practice, the storage sites in Eastern Europe could hold a total of 370 to 1,070 tactical nuclear bombs, and 1,700 to 2,900 FROG and Scud warheads. Table II-11 contains the-range_of estimatesof-storage caoacitvt 164. During the conventional phase of hostilities, about a third of the Navy's strike aircraft probably would be held in reserve for nuclear operations. Several Soviet writers also have indicated that a "large" reserve of submarines and nuclear-capable 168. There is no firm evidence on Pact require- surface ships might be withheld until the transition to ments for tactical nuclear warheads and bombs in nuclear war. The Soviets evidently see the risk of Central Europe. It seems clear, however, that the escalation to nuclear war to be so high that they are Soviets currently consider their requirements to be willing to sacrifice a substantial degree of their nonnu- higher than those envisioned by Pact planners as late 11-47 Top~e
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.