Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

i ~ToP
similar to the Scaleboard missile in range capability clear capabilities to be prepared for the more serious
but probably has improved accuracy and warheads. nuclear war contingency.
165. Soviet Nuclear Weapons Storage Sites in
161. Nuclear Artillery. The Soviets have 250 to 300 Eastern Europe. There are 23 Soviet storage sites in
nuclear-capable artillery pieces in their forces in the Eastern Europe, at least some of which almost certain-
western USSR. Nuclear-capable 203-mm self-proEleven of them are
pelled guns and 240-mm self-propelled mortars have located at Soviet tactical airfields, and 12 are isolated
been identified in two heavy artillery units there. Five installations for the storage of warheads for tactical
other heavy artillery units there are equipped with isileand rthe figre II-27.)
obsolete 203-mm and 240-mm weapons. No Soviet missiles and rockets. (See figure 11-27.)
heavy artillery units have been identified outside the
USSR. it is also
believed-ulilely that these installations, with their
extensive security, high-quality support facilities, and
in most instances apparently continuous occupation by
. Soviet troops, would be maintained simply as future
l'here is n o reliable evi staging points for warheads moved from the USSR in
dence that the Soviets have nuclear rounds for their time of tension or after a conflict began. We do not
152-mm artillery pieces-the largest now in the forces believe that the NSWP countries operate or control
in Central Europe. any of the nuclear storage sites in Eastern Europe.
162. Soviet nuclear artillery developments suggest 166.
that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded
as only a partial solution to the problems of providing
close-in nuclear support to Pact ground forces. Soviet
writings have long acknowledged that, because
NATO's nuclear-capable artillery would be deployed
close to the battleline, Pact artillery fire would be the
most effective and responsive means for destroying it.
163. Naval Forces. All fleets in the Soviet Navy are
also equipped with nuclear-capable weapon systems There is no firm evidence regarding the mix of
for use in theater warfare. Virtually all of the USSR's weapons stored in these bunkers, the portion of the
operational submarines carry nuclear interior space used for storage, or that reserved for
torpedoes, and at least half of the missiles on board -arhead_assembh, maintenance and checkout.
Soviet cruise-missile submarines are equipped with
nuclear warheads. This loading reflects the Soviet
belief that, although war could begin conventionally in
Europe, it would be fought under constant threat of 167. Depending on the type stored and storage
escalation to the use of nuclear weapons. practice, the storage sites in Eastern Europe could hold
a total of 370 to 1,070 tactical nuclear bombs, and
1,700 to 2,900 FROG and Scud warheads. Table II-11
contains the-range_of estimatesof-storage caoacitvt
164. During the conventional phase of hostilities,
about a third of the Navy's strike aircraft probably
would be held in reserve for nuclear operations.
Several Soviet writers also have indicated that a
"large" reserve of submarines and nuclear-capable 168. There is no firm evidence on Pact require-
surface ships might be withheld until the transition to ments for tactical nuclear warheads and bombs in
nuclear war. The Soviets evidently see the risk of Central Europe. It seems clear, however, that the
escalation to nuclear war to be so high that they are Soviets currently consider their requirements to be
willing to sacrifice a substantial degree of their nonnu- higher than those envisioned by Pact planners as late
11-47
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