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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

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“US Navy”42 pages

p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…

Top cret
missile (range of 120 to 130 km) roughly comparable
to the US Lance, is now with at least one division in
the western USSR. It offers major improvements in
range and accuracy over the FROG, which it is
replacing." The SS-21 evidently has a cluster-munition
159. Tactical Missiles. Ground force nuclear deliv- warhead in addition to the usual nuclear, chemical,
ery systems consist mainly of the FROG, Scud, and and conventional warheads. A cluster-munition war-
Scaleboard missiles. (See figure II-26.) The Soviets head would significantly improve the SS-21's utility
have 3] FROG battalions with some 125 launchers during conventional warfare against soft targets such
and1lScOud bargades with 150 launches in Eastern as personnel and equipment in the open or NATO air
defense and electronics installations. The SS-22, a
Europe. They have another 65 FROG battalions (260
launchers) and 20 Scud brigades (240 launchers) in replacement missile for the Scaleboard, became
their military districts opposite NATO. The Scud has a issued to some Scaleboard units in the USSR. It is
range of about 300 km -and the FROG about 70 km.
to be located in Eastern Europe, but we estimate that "The circular error probable (CEP) of the SS-21 is estimated to
six Scaleboard units with 72 launchers are part of the be 200 to 300 meters at two-thirds the maximum range of 120 to 130
kilometers. This is a significant improvement in accuracy over the
forces in the USSR earmarked for use against NATO. FROG-7, with a CEP of 400 meters at two-thirds the maximum
NSWP forces have 310 FROG and Scud launchers. range of 70 kilometers. CEP is a conventional index of accuracy
defined as the radius of the circle centered on the intended target
160. The Soviets are improving the quality of their within which there is a 50-percent probability that an arriving
tactical ballistic missile forces. The SS-21, a new missile warhead will fall.
Selected Warsaw Pact Tactical Surface-to-Surface Missiles 'Figure 11-26
FROG-7 SS-21 Scud B SS-12/22 Scaleboard
No
drawing -
g available ? -o-
Year operational 1965 1976 1961 1965/1977
Range (km)
Minimum 12 10-15 50 200
Maximum 70 120 300 925
Warhead yield (kt) 10 0.5 10 10
200 10 300 300
200 500
CEP (m) at 400 20O-300 500-900 700-800/300-400
two-thirds range*
Propulsion Single stage- Single stage- Single stage- Two stage-
solid solid liquid solid
'CEP (circular error probable) is a conventional index of accuracy
defined as the radius of a circle centered on the intended target
within which there is a 50-percent probability that an arriving
missile warhead will fall.
579030 an cu
11-46

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.