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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

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“The Advance”37 pages

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
Top cret
missile (range of 120 to 130 km) roughly comparable
to the US Lance, is now with at least one division in
the western USSR. It offers major improvements in
range and accuracy over the FROG, which it is
replacing." The SS-21 evidently has a cluster-munition
159. Tactical Missiles. Ground force nuclear deliv- warhead in addition to the usual nuclear, chemical,
ery systems consist mainly of the FROG, Scud, and and conventional warheads. A cluster-munition war-
Scaleboard missiles. (See figure II-26.) The Soviets head would significantly improve the SS-21's utility
have 3] FROG battalions with some 125 launchers during conventional warfare against soft targets such
and1lScOud bargades with 150 launches in Eastern as personnel and equipment in the open or NATO air
defense and electronics installations. The SS-22, a
Europe. They have another 65 FROG battalions (260
launchers) and 20 Scud brigades (240 launchers) in replacement missile for the Scaleboard, became
their military districts opposite NATO. The Scud has a issued to some Scaleboard units in the USSR. It is
range of about 300 km -and the FROG about 70 km.
to be located in Eastern Europe, but we estimate that "The circular error probable (CEP) of the SS-21 is estimated to
six Scaleboard units with 72 launchers are part of the be 200 to 300 meters at two-thirds the maximum range of 120 to 130
kilometers. This is a significant improvement in accuracy over the
forces in the USSR earmarked for use against NATO. FROG-7, with a CEP of 400 meters at two-thirds the maximum
NSWP forces have 310 FROG and Scud launchers. range of 70 kilometers. CEP is a conventional index of accuracy
defined as the radius of the circle centered on the intended target
160. The Soviets are improving the quality of their within which there is a 50-percent probability that an arriving
tactical ballistic missile forces. The SS-21, a new missile warhead will fall.
Selected Warsaw Pact Tactical Surface-to-Surface Missiles 'Figure 11-26
FROG-7 SS-21 Scud B SS-12/22 Scaleboard
No
drawing -
g available ? -o-
Year operational 1965 1976 1961 1965/1977
Range (km)
Minimum 12 10-15 50 200
Maximum 70 120 300 925
Warhead yield (kt) 10 0.5 10 10
200 10 300 300
200 500
CEP (m) at 400 20O-300 500-900 700-800/300-400
two-thirds range*
Propulsion Single stage- Single stage- Single stage- Two stage-
solid solid liquid solid
'CEP (circular error probable) is a conventional index of accuracy
defined as the radius of a circle centered on the intended target
within which there is a 50-percent probability that an arriving
missile warhead will fall.
579030 an cu
11-46

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.