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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
Top cret
missile (range of 120 to 130 km) roughly comparable
to the US Lance, is now with at least one division in
the western USSR. It offers major improvements in
range and accuracy over the FROG, which it is
replacing." The SS-21 evidently has a cluster-munition
159. Tactical Missiles. Ground force nuclear deliv- warhead in addition to the usual nuclear, chemical,
ery systems consist mainly of the FROG, Scud, and and conventional warheads. A cluster-munition war-
Scaleboard missiles. (See figure II-26.) The Soviets head would significantly improve the SS-21's utility
have 3] FROG battalions with some 125 launchers during conventional warfare against soft targets such
and1lScOud bargades with 150 launches in Eastern as personnel and equipment in the open or NATO air
defense and electronics installations. The SS-22, a
Europe. They have another 65 FROG battalions (260
launchers) and 20 Scud brigades (240 launchers) in replacement missile for the Scaleboard, became
their military districts opposite NATO. The Scud has a issued to some Scaleboard units in the USSR. It is
range of about 300 km -and the FROG about 70 km.
to be located in Eastern Europe, but we estimate that "The circular error probable (CEP) of the SS-21 is estimated to
six Scaleboard units with 72 launchers are part of the be 200 to 300 meters at two-thirds the maximum range of 120 to 130
kilometers. This is a significant improvement in accuracy over the
forces in the USSR earmarked for use against NATO. FROG-7, with a CEP of 400 meters at two-thirds the maximum
NSWP forces have 310 FROG and Scud launchers. range of 70 kilometers. CEP is a conventional index of accuracy
defined as the radius of the circle centered on the intended target
160. The Soviets are improving the quality of their within which there is a 50-percent probability that an arriving
tactical ballistic missile forces. The SS-21, a new missile warhead will fall.
Selected Warsaw Pact Tactical Surface-to-Surface Missiles 'Figure 11-26
FROG-7 SS-21 Scud B SS-12/22 Scaleboard
No
drawing -
g available ? -o-
Year operational 1965 1976 1961 1965/1977
Range (km)
Minimum 12 10-15 50 200
Maximum 70 120 300 925
Warhead yield (kt) 10 0.5 10 10
200 10 300 300
200 500
CEP (m) at 400 20O-300 500-900 700-800/300-400
two-thirds range*
Propulsion Single stage- Single stage- Single stage- Two stage-
solid solid liquid solid
'CEP (circular error probable) is a conventional index of accuracy
defined as the radius of a circle centered on the intended target
within which there is a 50-percent probability that an arriving
missile warhead will fall.
579030 an cu
11-46

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.