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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
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Warsaw Pact Tactical Nuclear Figure I-25 Table 11-10
Forces Opposite NATO,
1969 and 1979 Warsaw Pact Tactical Nuclear Forces
Opposite NATO *
3,000 January 1979
In Eastern Europe In the
Soviet NSWP USSR Total
2,000 ----
Tactical Aircraft
Fighters 765 - 580 1,345
Fighter-Bombers 450 135 650 . 1,235
1,000 Light Bombers 30 - 30 60
Total 1,245 135 1,260 2,640
Tactical Missile Launchers
0 Tactical Tactical Nuclear- FROG 125 185 260 570
Aircraft Missile Capable SS-1/Scud 150 125 240 515
1969 1979 Launchers Artillery SS-12/Scaleboard
1969 1979 Pieces (includes SS-22) - - 72 72
Secret 1979 SS-21 - - 6 6
Total 275 310 578 1,163577633 1-79 CIA
Nuclear Artillery
203-mm SP Guns/Towed
accuracy of their current missile systems and the ;un-Howitzers - - 144 144
lack of timely, accurate reconnaissance data on 240-mm SP Mortars/
small, mobile targets. Towed Mortars - - 144 144
- Development and deployment of a new genera- Total - - 288 288
tion of tactical nuclear delivery systems with * See footnote to table II-, following paragraph 3.
characteristics superior to those of their predeces-
sors. Newer models- of Soviet tactical aircraft
have greatly improved range and payload capa-
bilities, and more effective tactical surface-to- 157. Tactical Aircraft. Numerically, the most im-
surface missiles are being deployed. portant nuclear delivery systems in Eastern Europe
are Soviet tactical aircraft. Virtually all Soviet fighter
155. The Soviets have a variety of tactical nuclear and fighter-bomber units in Eastern Europe conduct
delivery systems in their ground and tactical air forces training and exercise activities which indicate a mis-
deployed opposite NATO. (See table II-10.) Nuclear sion of delivering nuclear bombs. As of 1975, however,
weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only about one-third of the pilots in these Soviet units
general purpose ships, submarines, and aircraft. were qualified by Soviet standards to drop nuclear
bombs. We expect that the number of Soviet tactical
156. The Soviets have given their East European air units in the USSR which have nuclear missions will
allies reason to believe that they will be provided increase as the Soviets continue to reequip units with
nuclear weapons in wartime. The NSWP national new, nuclear-capable aircraft.
commands, particularly the Polish and Czechoslovak 158. The role of Frontal Aviation for delivering
commands, evidently train and plan for the eventual- tactical nuclear weapons is expanding.
ity that they will receive nuclear warheads in wartime.
Fronts commanded by non-Soviets have also been
notionally allocated nuclear weapons in recent Pact
exercises. In addition, we have information that
NSWP war plans may include procedures for. the
transfer of Soviet nuclear warheads to NSWP missile
units. Thus, while we have no direct evidence regard-
ing Soviet intentions, we judge that NSWP tactical
aircraft and missiles, as shown in table 11-10, are likely
to be used for nuclear operations in Europe.
11-45
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.