Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
Western Europe by a bombing offensive. The large amphibious exercises with the Soviets. In the Baltic, and repetitive bombing attacks necessary for such an however, where large combined operations recently offensive would reduce the availability of aircraft for have occurred, the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the equivalent of four naval infantry regiments the battle for air superiority and the destruction of totaling some 8,000 men. Although the Polish and East NATO nuclear delivery systems. Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers against port facilities half of their assault troops in a single lift, turnaround early in a war. If the Pact achieved air superiority in time for subsequent lifts could be rapid. Western Europe, and if a large part of its bomber 152. Control of the airspace over an amphibious force remained, a systematic bombing campaign landing area in Europe would be a prereqmisite for against ports could be initiated. In a theater nuclear establishing a beachhead. Because the majority of war, the Soviets also would interdict shipping b likely Warsaw Pact amphibious objectives would bemissile and air strikes on ports in Western Europe and, within the range of Soviet or East European airfields,in an intercontinental war, those in North America as land-based tactical aircraft could be made available to support the assault forces. The Soviet Fitter C/D 149. Pact intentions for using mines to interdict regiment in the Baltic Fleet Air Force and some 50 merchant shipping are not clear. While some Soviet MIG-17 Frescos of the Polish Navy probably would submarines may have a wartime mission to lay mines support Pact amphibious operations in the Baltic Sea. in restricted water such as in the approaches to a few key NATO ports, they would not have the capability to mine large areas of the North Atlantic littoral D Theater Nuclear Forces densely and still perform other missions. Soviet surface ships and aircraft would be unable to lay and replenish minefields effectively in areas of NATO air 153. Pact nuclear weapons which could be em- superiority. ployed in a theater war against NATO are of two distinct types: tactical nuclear weapons in the hands of Amphibious Capabilities Soviet general purpose forces and Soviet strategic 150. The Soviets have some 6,000 men in their nuclear weapons. Naval Infantry forces opposite NATO. The basic unit Tactical Nuclear Forces is the naval rifle regiment, totaling about 1,900 men in three infantry battalions, a tank battalion, and sup- 154. Since the late 1960s the tactical forces have porting units. Three regiments have been identified, especially experienced important changes in both size one in each western fleet area. The Naval Infantry, and capabilities. (See figure II-25.) These changes have depends heavily on its tanks and armored vehicles, but included: is constituted primarily for mobility rather than for firepower. Its tasks are to spearhead amphibious as- -Significant increases in the inventory of tactical saults against mainland and island beachheads and to nuclear delivery systems in Europe. The expan- attack in the rear of enemy formations-in both cases sion has already included about a one-third in support of the ground campaign. In some cases, increase in the number of tactical surface-to- Naval Infantry units would be immediately reinforced surface missile launchers and a tripling of nu- from the sea by ground forces trained for follow-up clear delivery aircraft in Central Europe since 1970. amphibious landings. 151. The amphibious elements of NSWP countries - Increases in the number of tactical nuclear weap- would be available to augment the Soviet Naval ons the Soviets plan to use in Central Europe. Infantry forces. In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted strength of the Soviet, Bulgarian, and Romanian am- in exercises conducted by the critical Central phibious forces total some 4,400 men. However, the Front have tripled. Bulgarian and Romanian elements are not nearly as - Increases in the warhead yields of tactical sur- well trained as their Soviet counterparts and do not face-to-surface missiles. The motivation for the have sufficient lift capacity to carry all of their men larger yields is unclear, but the Soviets may and equipment in a single assault operation. These perceive a requirement for greater areas of de- countries do not usually engage in combined struction to compensate for the relatively poor 11-44 op et
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.