Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North
Atlantic sea lanes. They point out that if NATO
Estimated Torpedo Capacity for Soviet convoys were routed southward to reduce the
Attack Submarines _ danger from Pact aircraft, Soviet submarines
Long-Range Submarine Class Number of Torpedoes b would have to travel 2,500 to 3,500 nm; nuclear-
V 16-18 powered submarines traveling at 12 knots would
C 12 spend about 22 days in a round trip (6,000 nm) to
N 18-20 the sea lanes, while diesels averaging 5 knots
E-11 8 would spend 54 days in transit. The others note
J 6
r 22 that despite the long transit distances, Soviet
1 22 long-range attack submarines have the range to
z 22 undertake patrols in the North Atlantic sea lanes
Medium-Range Submarine Class of sufficient duration to have ample opportunity
W 12 to attack a number of Western ships.
R 14
- - - - ----- __- - - Combat Attrition. All agree that Soviet subma-
aAssumes each submarine carries a full load of 53-centimeter (7.8 rinesmbas in e Nor eet wouldthavbmao
meters long) antishipping torpedoes. rmes based m the Northern Fleet would have to
b The Director,Defense Intelligence Agency, points out that the travel through the Norwegian Sea and the G-I-
"full wartime load" of these submarinesis unknown and that these UK gap, areas which favor N ATO ASW efforts,
estimates are predicated on a loading under peacetime operating and that even on station, operating areas would
conditions of weapons of 53-cm diameter (7.8 meters long). His be continuously within range of NATO's land-
agency estimates that two 40-cm torpedoes (4.5 meters long)
probably could be substituted for each of up to six 53-cm.torpedoes based ASW aircraft, as well as other ASW plat-
in most classes. The Director of DIA notes, therefore, that the forms. The first view is that the resultant combat
wartime torpedo loads of these classes could be substantially attrition would be prohibitive. The second is that,
greater than shown although Soviet submarines would be particu-
larly open to attack by Western ASW forces at
S- Replenishment Opr e Tseveral points, this threat would be reduced by
holds that Soviet submarines would have to attacks against NATO ASW aircraft and bases,
on SIGINT facilities, and on facilities of the USreturn to home waters for resupply, that Soviet sound surveillance system (SOSUS).
naval support ships probably would not operate
outside Soviet-controlled waters because they - Target Information. The first group believes
would be vulnerable to attack, and that any that it would be difficult for attack submarines to
Soviet merchant ships at sea when war began identify high-value ships in ocean traffic contain-
probably would not be available by the time the ing many ships of low value. They note that
submarines exhausted their torpedoes. According under North Atlantic combat and weather condi-
to the second view, Soviet long-range attack tions, attacks on merchant ships would be likely
submarines can operate for periods of weeks to result in little more than random success at
without having to refuel and, conceivably, could destroying ships loaded with military cargoes
take on fuel from Pact merchant ships, and an instead of ships loaded with civilian industrial or
individual submarine would probably have suffi- other goods. The second group judges that the
cient time to attack its targets before having to Soviets probably would have clandestine report-
return to base for torpedo reloading. ing, including detailed information on cargoes
- Turnaround Time. All agree that Soviet subma- and ship departure times, as well as locating data
rines would have to spend some time in port from technical collection, including radar and
between patrols. The first group believes it might ELINT ocean reconnaissance satellites and long-
be as long as 25 days, which was the German range HF/DF. According to this view, the com-
experience in World War Ii. The second believes bination of these assets would likely provide the
the time could be compressed to less than 25 intelligence necessary to direct attacks on the
days, especially in a period of intense conflict. more valuable convoys and-with greater
difficulty-individual ships.
- Transit Distance. Holders of the first view be-
lieve that the effectiveness of Soviet submarines 148. All agree that, in a conventional war, the
would be impaired by the distance between the Soviets could attempt to disrupt port operations in
11-43