Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

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144. The Soviets currently maintain an active in- latter view believe that the timing and extent of Soviet
ventory of about 180 cruise-missile and torpedo attack interdiction operations depend more upon the disposi-
submarines in their western fleets. Of these, the some tion and tactics of NATO naval forces and upon Soviet
115 long-range units based in the Northern Fleet, the intentions and expectations as to the course of the
only fleet in the western USSR with largely unre- conflict, than upon the prior achievement of other
stricted access to the North Atlantic sea lanes, form a naval tasks. According to this view, circumstances such
potential strike force for interdiction. The demands as an early stalemate in Central Europe or a NATO
placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier and amphibious forces
sions would limit the number of submarines available immediately into the Norwegian Sea would lead the
for interdiction because large numbers of Soviet naval Soviets to mount a substantial interdiction effort
forces would have to be devoted to controlling the during the early phase of a conflict when NATO
Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would be convoying critical war material, including
Sea, as well as their approaches, against incursion by elements of US divisions and their equipment,, to
Western carriers, amphibious forces and submarines, Europe.
and because a portion of the Soviet attack submarine 147. There are also disagreements over Soviet capa-
force probably would be committed to operations bilities to execute an interdiction campaign, irrespec-
against NATO naval bases and in the open ocean. biiistexceannerciocmagirse-
tive of the Soviet committment to interdiction. These
145. There is disagreement within the Intelligence disagreements stem from different judgments and
Community .concerning the extent, emphasis, and interpretations of evidence regarding: torpedo loads,
timing of the interdiction campaign. Some believe " replenishment opportunities, turnaround time, transit
that the Soviets would commit some of their subma- distance, combat attrition, and target information.
rine fleet to an interdiction campaign, but not a large
portion unless they had earlier defeated NATO carrier - Torpedo Loads. According to the first view,
and amphibious forces without losing many of their Soviet naval strategy stresses the likelihood of a
submarines. Others believe " that the Soviets would short nuclear war and the importance of striking
regard interdiction of US reinforcements to Europe to a few high-value targets. The torpedo capacities
be of such significance and their submarine inventory of Soviet submarines are consistent with this
of sufficient depth to warrant use of substantial num- strategy, but would severely limit the number of
bers of attack submarines in this effort while still attacks against merchant ships the submarines
accomplishing their other missions. could make while on station during an interdic-
146. Those holding the former view believe that the tion campaign (see table II-9). Soviet cruise
Soviets would be deterred from seriously trying to missile submarines, which constitute nearly one-
exploit the West's dependence on long sea lines of third of the USSR's fleet of long-range general
communication unless attrition-or Western strat- purpose submarines, carry few (the C-class) or no
egy-reduced the threat from NATO's nuclear strike (the E-I1 and the J-class) torpedo reloads. Soviet
and projection forces. According to this view, the long-range torpedo attack submarines can carry
presence of NATO carriers in or near areas like the 16 to 22 torpedoes, but in practice many of these
Norwegian and Mediterranean Seas would cause the would not be used against merchant ships be-
Soviets to commit large forces in counteraction, heavy cause recent evidence shows that combat-ready
losses would result, and the Soviets would lack the Soviet submarines are loaded with ASW and
submarines to engage simultaneously in strong anti- nuclear torpedoes, as well as antiship weapons.
fleet and antishipping operations. Those holding the The second view holds that the Soviet long-range
" The holders of the first view are the Central Intelligence attack submarines most likely to participate in
Agency; the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, De- such a campaign (principally the N-class, F-class,
partment of State; and the Director, National Security Agency. and T-class) clearly carry sufficient torpedoes toThe Director of NSA further believes that the extent and degree of
a campaign against the sea lines of communication is largely conduct a significant number of attacks on West-
scenario dependent and that, in a prolonged crisis, where the ern shipping. Additionally, the loading of indi-
outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of interdiction in vidual. submarines would be contingent on as-
advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense sarily have a mix of different weapon types in
Intelligence Agency, and the Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy. wartime as is customary in peacetime.
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