Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“US Navy”42 pages
Top ec 136. Although the undersea surveillance capabilities strategy calls for establishing sea control in the Barents of the Pact navies are only fair in coastal waters, they Sea and in the closed seas-the Baltic and Black are better there than in more distant areas because the Seas-thus denying these waters to the enemy. The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their naval forces in antisubmarine sensors emplaced near their own coasts. these areas, including some principal combatants, and Among the surveillance systems in these coastal waters large numbers of smaller combatants, submarines, and are individual and field arrangements of tethered, ASW aircraft. These forces continue to receive new short-range acoustic buoys; various ships and subma- ships with the latest attack and air defense missiles, rines on picket duty; shore-based surface-search ra- sonars, torpedoes, and mine-warfare equipment. They dars; and HF/DF intercept sites. can be supported by fighter and attack aircraft of the 7 Soviet Air Defense Forces and Frontal Aviation. The 137. Iecnicalsum, cteruitns of Whestesumin, Pact has also concentrated coastal defense missile and the Ptech n al ch ratersingc pabilitieofme 'in artillery batteries to defend ports, -bases, and other and Pact signal processing capabilities combine m crtclfaiiis most cases to restrict severely the range at which Western su marines 141. In addition to using the forces described above can e-dtetected-Locatmg data could be provided at to attack approaching NATO naval forces, the Pact greater ranges through detection of periscopes or other would probably lay defensive minefields, particularly masts with surface search radars (especially in low sea in key areas. Although there is little specific evidence states) or through IF/DF of radio transmissions in the the large number cases in which they occur. of ships for mining-as well as the submarines and aircraft capable of laying mines-suggests that the 138. In waters beyond the Pacts coastal regions, Soviets probably plan to conduct mine warfare on a Soviet ships and submarines. including those best. et considerable scale. Additionally, naval exercises indi- equipped for ASW, are vulnerable to attack by NATO caettthPctxptsocndtcuteme cate that the Fact expects to conduct countermine stlnain. arevulneraoperations against NATO mining in approaches to Pact countries. Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea Lines of Communication 142. In wartime, the Soviets probably would at- tempt sea denial operations in NATO's sea lines of communication by attacking noncombatant ships- merchant vessels and naval auxiliaries-on the high seas, striking ports and harbors, and mining heavily traveled waters. The extent of the commitment of 139. Nevertheless, there are situations, particularly forces to an interdiction effort would depend on a in their own coastal waters and ocean areas over which number of factors such as the emphasis on operations they have temporary control, in which Pact ASW against carriers, amphibious ships and SSBNs, the forces might be able to prevent NATO submarines course of the conflict, the level at which it is initiated, from disrupting key maritime operations. Soviet and Soviet expectations as to the degree and pace of combined Pact amphibious and convoy exercises often escalation, and the extent of Pact and NATO include substantial numbers of units employed as ASW mobilization. screening forces, and in wartime such tactics could 143. Successful attacks on noncombatant ships at well be effective-especially in areas accessible to 143 S ul attck onnocmatants at Soviet air forces, or in operations against the less sea would depend primarily on the availability and capable NATO submarine forces. .capability of Soviet attack submarines for this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in the Sea aircraft would rule out their use-if operating out of Approaches to the Soviet Union Soviet bases-over most of the length of the more southerly sea lanes to Great Britain and France. They 140. In theater hostilities in Europe, a high-priority have some capability near Great Britain, but unless air task of the Pact navies would be to ensure that their defenses there were destroyed, such strikes could be sea approaches were secure and open to Pact use. Pact more costly than the expected results might warrant. ||-41 Top t
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.