Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

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136. Although the undersea surveillance capabilities strategy calls for establishing sea control in the Barents
of the Pact navies are only fair in coastal waters, they Sea and in the closed seas-the Baltic and Black
are better there than in more distant areas because the Seas-thus denying these waters to the enemy. The
Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their naval forces in
antisubmarine sensors emplaced near their own coasts. these areas, including some principal combatants, and
Among the surveillance systems in these coastal waters large numbers of smaller combatants, submarines, and
are individual and field arrangements of tethered, ASW aircraft. These forces continue to receive new
short-range acoustic buoys; various ships and subma- ships with the latest attack and air defense missiles,
rines on picket duty; shore-based surface-search ra- sonars, torpedoes, and mine-warfare equipment. They
dars; and HF/DF intercept sites. can be supported by fighter and attack aircraft of the
7 Soviet Air Defense Forces and Frontal Aviation. The
137. Iecnicalsum, cteruitns of Whestesumin, Pact has also concentrated coastal defense missile and
the Ptech n al ch ratersingc pabilitieofme 'in artillery batteries to defend ports, -bases, and other
and Pact signal processing capabilities combine m crtclfaiiis
most cases to restrict severely the range
at which Western su marines 141. In addition to using the forces described above
can e-dtetected-Locatmg data could be provided at to attack approaching NATO naval forces, the Pact
greater ranges through detection of periscopes or other would probably lay defensive minefields, particularly
masts with surface search radars (especially in low sea in key areas. Although there is little specific evidence
states) or through IF/DF of radio transmissions in the the large number
cases in which they occur. of ships for mining-as well as the submarines and
aircraft capable of laying mines-suggests that the
138. In waters beyond the Pacts coastal regions, Soviets probably plan to conduct mine warfare on a
Soviet ships and submarines. including those best.
et considerable scale. Additionally, naval exercises indi-
equipped for ASW, are vulnerable to attack by NATO caettthPctxptsocndtcuteme
cate that the Fact expects to conduct countermine
stlnain. arevulneraoperations against NATO mining in approaches to
Pact countries.
Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea
Lines of Communication
142. In wartime, the Soviets probably would at-
tempt sea denial operations in NATO's sea lines of
communication by attacking noncombatant ships-
merchant vessels and naval auxiliaries-on the high
seas, striking ports and harbors, and mining heavily
traveled waters. The extent of the commitment of
139. Nevertheless, there are situations, particularly forces to an interdiction effort would depend on a
in their own coastal waters and ocean areas over which number of factors such as the emphasis on operations
they have temporary control, in which Pact ASW against carriers, amphibious ships and SSBNs, the
forces might be able to prevent NATO submarines course of the conflict, the level at which it is initiated,
from disrupting key maritime operations. Soviet and Soviet expectations as to the degree and pace of
combined Pact amphibious and convoy exercises often escalation, and the extent of Pact and NATO
include substantial numbers of units employed as ASW mobilization.
screening forces, and in wartime such tactics could 143. Successful attacks on noncombatant ships at
well be effective-especially in areas accessible to 143 S ul attck onnocmatants at
Soviet air forces, or in operations against the less sea would depend primarily on the availability and
capable NATO submarine forces. .capability of Soviet attack submarines for this mission.
The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval
Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in the Sea aircraft would rule out their use-if operating out of
Approaches to the Soviet Union Soviet bases-over most of the length of the more
southerly sea lanes to Great Britain and France. They
140. In theater hostilities in Europe, a high-priority have some capability near Great Britain, but unless air
task of the Pact navies would be to ensure that their defenses there were destroyed, such strikes could be
sea approaches were secure and open to Pact use. Pact more costly than the expected results might warrant.
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