“The Advance”37 pages
- p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power
Arena. We proceed…
- p. 25 …We
foresee no development over the next several years which would
appreciably alter the basic Pact…
- p. 26 …advances
and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a
modest decline in the…
- p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC
interdiction in advance of a…
- p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
- p. 40 …permit the high rates of
appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
- p. 46 …The holders
sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
- p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick
difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
- p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
- p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to
units. The Soviets believe that a…
- p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in
irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
- p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
- p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
- p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning
but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
- p. 108 …the ability to sustain
the momentum of an advance is determined not only
by the availability…
- p. 112 Top e
ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
- p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced
notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin-
ning of…
- p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con-
man…
- p. 126 …advance, Pact
planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
- p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis
up…
- p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using
advance or exploitation along…
- p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to
Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
- p. 147 …surface ships into the
important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
- p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus.
attack…
- p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
- p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea
these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
- p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the
several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
- p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
- p. 172 …The changes will improve
radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
- p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
- p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers.
for these…
- p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans-
survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
- p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable
units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
- p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
- p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced
82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
- p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic
ture. The VAKSS…
- p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that
advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
Topee±
and surface search radars. (See figure 11-24.)
133. Other Soviet forces opposite NATO-desig,
nated primarily for coastal ASW-are much more
numerous, but their individual capabilities are gener-
ally poorer. These include about 155 minor surface
combatants with sonars, about 45 short- and medium-
range diesel submarines, nearly 60 short-range fixed-
' The holders of this vice are the Central Intelligence Agency wing ASW aircraft, and about 100 shore-based ASW
and the Director, National Security Agency. helicopters. In addition, the Polish, East German, and
to a lesser degree the Bulgarian and Romanian Navies
have a variety of units which are trained for coastal
Selected Soviet Aircraft , Figure 11-24 ASW defense and are being integrated into the com-
for Antisubmarine Warfare bined Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas.
IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F
bottom iew
Year operational 1968 1971 135. Effective ASW depends in part on Pact sur-
veillance capabilities, which, outside coastal waters,
Payload (kg) Sonobuoys, Sonobuoys, are extremely limited. This limitation is primarily
torpedoes, and torpedoes, and caused by Soviet failure to develop long-range under-
depth chargesb depth chargesh sea surveillance systems. Soviet efforts to achieve such
(5,400) (8,500) a capability would, in any event, he constrained
Maximum radiusa 1,350 2,050 or 3,150c because the Pact lacks sites from which major Western
(nm) naval operating areas could be monitored. Further-
more, if the Soviets were to emplace an underwater
a. Radius values include allowance for three hours of loiter time surveillance system on Pact territory, its effectiveness
on station, would be limited because the waters along Pact shores
are for the most part shallow and therefore unsuitable
for carrying sounds over long distances.
c. See paragraphs 131 and 132 of chapter II for differing agency
views on the radius of the Bear F. 20 The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of
the Navy; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Depart-
5902 ,, u nmentof the Air Force.
11-40
Top ae, t