Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Headquarters”14 pages
Topee± and surface search radars. (See figure 11-24.) 133. Other Soviet forces opposite NATO-desig, nated primarily for coastal ASW-are much more numerous, but their individual capabilities are gener- ally poorer. These include about 155 minor surface combatants with sonars, about 45 short- and medium- range diesel submarines, nearly 60 short-range fixed- ' The holders of this vice are the Central Intelligence Agency wing ASW aircraft, and about 100 shore-based ASW and the Director, National Security Agency. helicopters. In addition, the Polish, East German, and to a lesser degree the Bulgarian and Romanian Navies have a variety of units which are trained for coastal Selected Soviet Aircraft , Figure 11-24 ASW defense and are being integrated into the com- for Antisubmarine Warfare bined Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas. IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F bottom iew Year operational 1968 1971 135. Effective ASW depends in part on Pact sur- veillance capabilities, which, outside coastal waters, Payload (kg) Sonobuoys, Sonobuoys, are extremely limited. This limitation is primarily torpedoes, and torpedoes, and caused by Soviet failure to develop long-range under- depth chargesb depth chargesh sea surveillance systems. Soviet efforts to achieve such (5,400) (8,500) a capability would, in any event, he constrained Maximum radiusa 1,350 2,050 or 3,150c because the Pact lacks sites from which major Western (nm) naval operating areas could be monitored. Further- more, if the Soviets were to emplace an underwater a. Radius values include allowance for three hours of loiter time surveillance system on Pact territory, its effectiveness on station, would be limited because the waters along Pact shores are for the most part shallow and therefore unsuitable for carrying sounds over long distances. c. See paragraphs 131 and 132 of chapter II for differing agency views on the radius of the Bear F. 20 The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelli- gence Agency, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Depart- 5902 ,, u nmentof the Air Force. 11-40 Top ae, t
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.