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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
Topeee
along with the Kyndas, can receive target data from extremely difficult. The Pact navies must seek out
Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and
data directly from radar and electronic intelligence counter Western attack submarines. Attacks on West-
satellites and possibly could use its V/STOL aircraft ern SSBNs would have to be undertaken in their
for targeting assistance. The remaining eight missile- worldwide patrol and base areas. The task of counter-
equipped ships are destroyers, each armed with four ing attack submarines would be markedly different for
missiles that can be fired to a maximum range of about protecting Pact forces in the approaches to the USSR,
45 nm (80 km). on the one hand, and for the protection of Soviet naval
operations in more distant waters, on the other.
1.24. Other Soviet surface combatants opposite
NATO which are equipped with antiship cruise mis-
ses lude 14 Nanuchka-class and about 75 Osa-classcapabilities on the whole ar extremely limited. The crucial Soviet shortcomings are
missile patrol boats. The former are fitted with six 60- lack of long-range submarine detection devices, the
nm (110-km) SS-N-9 missiles, while the Osa units have high radiated noise levels of Soviet submarines relative
four 19-nm (35-km) SS-N-2b or 45-nm (83-km) to those of the West, and the lack of seaborne tactical
SS-N-2c missiles each. Except for the SS-N-2 series, all air cover to protect deployed surface ship ASW forces.
current Soviet antiship cruise missiles are believed Nonetheless, virtually all modern Soviet surface com-
capable of carrying a nuclear or a conventional batants carry ASW weapons and sensors, and large
warhead. numbers of Soviet aircraft and helicopters are fitted
125. Although the Soviets have a large inventory of for ASW operations.
ships, submarines, and aircraft capable of conducting
attacks on NATO ships, the successful accomplishment 129. The forces opposite NATO which are most
of such strikes under wartime situations depends on a capable of ASW operations beyond coastal waters
variety of factors. Among the most significant are: the include about 50 Soviet principal surface combatants,"
effectiveness of Soviet ocean surveillance and elec- 30 nuclear-powered torpedo attack submarines, and
tronic warfare, the number of launch platforms avail- about 45 fixed-wing ASW aircraft. The 16 ships with
able for antiship use, the achievement of strategic or helicopters (those of the Kiev, Moskva, Kara, and
tactical surprise, and whether nuclear weapons are Kresta-II classes) and the Krivak frigates are equipped
used by the Soviets or NATO. With accurate targeting with long-range (15 to 30 nm, or 28 to 56 km) ASW
and the use of nuclear weapons in surprise attacks, the weapons. Only the Kiev- and Moskva-class units com-
Soviet naval forces normally deployed in peacetime bine these features with a long-range (typically less
would constitute a severe threat to NATO carriers and than 10 nm) active sonar and more than one helicop-
amphibious task groups in European waters. Timely ter. Soviet ASW helicopters, however, are limited in
warning of a Soviet attack, however, would allow their ASW operations at night and in bad weather.
NATO task forces to take action which could enhance
their survivability. 130. The V-class nuclear-powered attack subma-
rines, of which 19 are in the Northern Fleet, are the
126. The surface-to-air missile systems aboard some most capable Soviet submarines for ASW.
75 Soviet principal surface combatants can also be
used against surface ships. The most capable of these
systems is the SA-N-3, which has an operational range
of 10 to 20 nm (18 to 37 kin) in an antiship mode and
may have a nuclear as well as a conventional warhead.
This system is installed in the Soviet western fleets' 16
units of the Kiev, Moskva, Kara, and Kresta-II classes,
probably with magazine capacities of either 48 or 72
missiles. In addition, the ASW homing torpedo pay-
load of the SS-N-14 cruise missile could be used
against surface ships, but we consider this unlikely. 131. The Soviet medium- and long-range airborne
ASW capability consists of IL-38 May and TU-142
Antisubmarine Warfare Capabilities Bear F aircraft, which are equipped with sonobuoys
127. In a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, the Pact's " Ships of the Kiev, Moskva, Kresta-II, Kara, Kashin, Mod-
antisubmarine warfare tasks would be varied and Kashin, and Krivak classes.
11-39
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.